The Lords having pass'd a Bill for repealing the Triennial Act. send it to the Commons for their Concurrence.; Debate thereon.
April 19. The Lords having sent Mr Justice Tracy and
Mr Justice Dormer to acquaint the Commons, that they had
pass'd a Bill intituled, An Act for enlarging the Time of Continuance of Parliaments, appointed by an Act made in the 6th
Year of King William and Queen Mary, to which they desir'd
their Concurrence: The Lord Guernsey immediately mov'd,
to reject the Bill, without reading it: But because that would
have been an unprecedented Method of Proceeding, the House
would not agree to it, but read the Bill the first Time, and
the Question being put, that it be read a second Time, there
arose a Debate that lasted about two Hours. The most remarkable Objection that was then urg'd against the Bill, was,
'That it was an Imposition of the Lords, to take upon them
to direct the Commons in a Matter which concern'd them
only, as Guardians of the Rights and Liberties of the People.' But to this it was answer'd, 'That even the Triennial
Act itself was begun in the House of Lords, who, as Part of
the Legislature, are no less Guardians of the Liberties of the
Subject than the Commons themselves. At length it was
carry'd by a Majority of 276 against 156, that the Bill should
be read a second Time on the Tuesday following.
April 24. Six Petitions, viz. Of the Boroughs and Towns
of Marlborough, Midhurst, Hastings, Cambridge, Abingdon,
and Newcastle under Line, against the Bill, being presented
to the House and read, they were severally ordered to lie
upon the Table. Then the Bill was read the second Time;
and a Motion being made, and the Question put, That it be
committed, there arose a warm Debate, that lasted from
two in the Afternoon 'till near Eleven at Night. The
Speakers for the Bill were, Mr Lyddal, Member for Lest
withiel; Mr Trevanian, Knight of the Shire for Cornwall;
Mr Molineux, (fn. 1) Member for Bossiney; Sir John Brownlow, Bart. (fn. 2) Knight of the Shire for Lincoln; Mr Hampden, (fn. 3) Member for Bucking hamshire; Mr Molesworth, (fn. 4)
Member for St Michael; Mr John Smith, (fn. 5) Member for
Eastlow; Lord Stanhope, (fn. 6) Member for St Germains;
Mr Young, (fn. 7) Member for Honiton; Mr Craiggs, (fn. 8)
Member for Tregony; Lord Coningsby, (fn. 9) Member for
Leominster; Mr Giles Erle, (fn. 10) Member for Chippenham;
Sir Richard Steele, (fn. 11) Member for Borough-Bridge; Mr
Nevile, Member for Berwick; Sir Charles Turner, (fn. 12)
Member for Lynn; Sir William Thompson, (fn. 13) Member
for Ipswich; Sir Joseph Jekyll, (fn. 14) Member for Lymington;
Gen. Stanhope, (fn. 15) Member for Cockermouth; Mr Aislabie,
(fn. 16) Member for Ripon. The Speakers against the Bill were,
Mr Robert Heysham, (fn. 17) Member for London; Mr Snell,
Member for Gloucester; Mr Shippen, Member for Newton;
Lord Paget, (fn. 18) Member for Staffordshire; Mr Wykes,
Member for Northampton; Mr Hutchinson, (fn. 19) Member
for Hastings; Mr Jefferies, (fn. 20) Member for Droitwich;
Sir Thomas Cross, Bart. Member for Westminster: Sir
William Whitlock and Mr William Bromley, Members for
the University of Oxford; Mr Archer, Member for Warwickshire; Lord Guernsey, Member for Surrey; Sir Thomas
Hanmer, Member for Suffolk; General Ross, Member for
the Shire of Ross; Sir Robert Raymond, (fn. 21) Member for
Ludlow; Mr Hungerford, (fn. 22) Member for Scarborough;
Mr Ward, (fn. 23) Member for Thetford; Mr Walter Chetwynd, (fn. 24) Member for Stafford; Mr Lechmere, (aa) Member for Cockermouth.
Mr Lyddal, who open'd the Debate, spoke as follows:
Mr Lyddal's Speech for the Bill.
Mr Speaker,
'You have now under your Consideration a Matter of as
great Weight and Importance, as, I believe, ever came before any Parliament; for where the Rights and Liberties of
the Subject appear to be concern'd, then certainly it is fit to
proceed with the utmost Caution and Regard. The Triennial Act was, no doubt, originally intended as a Barrier and
Defence of those Rights and Liberties, against any oppressive
or arbitrary Invasions of the Crown: And tho' we are so
happy as to have a good Prince now upon the Throne, who is
likely to be succeeded by one equally so, yet such great Blessings were never entail'd upon a People. No Body can be
more for supporting the just Prerogative, than I am, because
I always take it to be a Power of doing Good: And therefore,
if upon the strictest Examination I could find, that what is at
present propos'd, would throw the Ballance of Power too
much on the Side of the Crown, I should then think it not
only hurtful and dangerous to the Publick, but fatal and destructive to the Constitution. In order to enter farther into
this Subject, it is proper to look back from whence a Bill of
this Kind first took its Rise: In the Year 1640 a Bill for Triennial Parliaments, or that which was very like it, was pass'd;
but with a Clause in it, of a hard and compulsory Nature,
derogatory to the Crown, and, indeed, unreasonable in itself,
with many other disagreeable Circumstances. It is well
known what was the Consequence of those unhappy Differences, between the King and his People. After the Restoration, in the 16th of King Charles II. this Act, which immediately preceded a long and bloody Civil War, was repeal'd by another Act, the Preamble of which is very remarkable: And thus Things remain'd 'till some Time after the
Revolution, when King William was prevail'd upon to pass
this now, I hope, dying Law. I am sure nothing could prevail with me either to enlarge or alter this Act, were I not
convinc'd by comparing the Arguments on both Sides, that
the not doing of it is liable to more Inconvenience and Danger. If you do it, you effectually strengthen the Hands of
the King; settle and maintain the Protestant Succession, by
destroying the vain Hopes of all its Enemies, both at Home
and Abroad. You encourage your Allies to join with you,
nay, and to depend that what shall hereafter be stipulated and
agreed upon, will be punctually perform'd. This Experiment may, perhaps, at first disquiet the Minds of the People;
especially when they are exasperated by all the Endeavours of
Men averse and disaffected to the Government. However, a
little Time will shew, that it will entirely break our Parties
and Divisions, and by that Means lay a firm and solid Foundation for the future Tranquility and Happiness of this Kingdom. Besides, if this Opportunity be lost, you may possibly
never have another, at least so good a one, not only to conquer, but even to eradicate that Spirit of Jacobitism, which
has long dwelt among us, and has more than once brought this
Nation to the very Brink of Ruin and Destruction. Since
therefore, with much Danger and Difficulty, we have at last
secur'd our Religion, Laws, and Liberties, when all was at
Stake, from the Treachery of the late Ministry, the unaccountable Proceedings of the last Triennial Parliament, why should
you run the Risk of having a new one so soon, first chosen by
French Money, and then voting by French Directions? Since
the King and his Parliament exert their united Power for the
Good of the Publick, and to retrieve the Honour of the Nation, why should they not continue longer together, that they
may finish what they have so unanimously and so happily
begun?
Upon the whole, Sir, the Electors and People of all the
Boroughs in England having been, for several Years past, both
brib'd and preach'd into the Pretender's Interest, and a Dislike of the Protestant Succession, it becomes rather Necessity
than Choice to apply an extraordinary Remedy to an extraordinary Disease: Therefore I shall give you no farther
Trouble, but make you a very short Motion, which is, That
this Bill be committed.
Mr. Shippen spoke against the Bill as follows:
Mr Shippen's Speech against the Bill.
Mr. Speaker,
'I know my Duty to this House, and the Consequence of
any unguarded Expressions better than to say, that by any
Bills we have already pass'd, we have made so wide a Gap in
the Constitution, that the Force of the Law is in a Manner destroy'd; or that, by any Thing we have done, we have pav'd
the Way to a despotick and military Government, the greatest
Calamity that can besal a freeborn People. Such Reflections
may come from Persons without Doors, who, tho' they may
with Justice complain when their Liberties are invaded, yet
cannot always enter into the Depth and Wisdom of our Counsels, and are too apt to censure what they do not understand.
No Member can regularly arraign any Bills the same Session
they have obtain'd the Force and Sanction of Laws. But this
Bill, tho' it hath already got through the most difficult Part
of its Passage, and tho' it will in all Probability be the next Law
that shall be made, is yet unpass'd, is yet before us for our
Consideration, and we have a Right to treat it with Freedom:
Freedom of Speech, I presume, will not only be allow'd, but
is expected on this Occasion. I hope therefore, as the Business
of this Day hath rais'd an universal Expectation throughout
the Kingdom, so Gentlemen who are more able, (none is more
willing than my self) will appear with Resolution and Spirit
in this important Debate; in this, perhaps, our last Struggle
for the Liberties of those we represent.
'I think, then, all the Arguments which have been us'd
for this Bill, are grounded on mere Surmises and Imaginations only; are either trifling in themselves, or dangerous in
their Consequence.
'One main Reason urg'd, both in the Preamble of the
Bill, and in the Debates of the Gentlemen who are for it,
is this:
'That the Disaffections of the People are so great, and
the Enemies of the Government both at Home and Abroad
so watchful, that new Elections will occasion new Riots, rekindle the Rebellion, and be destructive to the Peace and
Security of the Government, which will all be prevented
by continuing this good Parliament, and making the Time
of its Dissolution uncertain.
'If this Argument be apply'd to the Ministry, I can only
answer, that it is no Concern of ours, whether they have
render'd themselves odious to the People, or not. They
are more properly the Object of our Jealousy, than of our
Care. They may be destroy'd, and the Government subsist. But if it be apply'd to his Majesty, as it must be to
make it any Inducement to pass this Bill, I will venture to
say, that none of those, who are call'd Enemies to the Government, and Abettors of the Rebellion, could have offer'd
an Argument so injurious to his Majesty's Honour. For
with what Face can any good Subject insinuate, that in the
Infancy of his Reign he hath depriv'd himself of the Love
and Affection of a People, who so lately receiv'd him with
the utmost Expressions of Joy? What an unjust Idea must
this give of his most mild and gracious Government? But
the Affertion is the more injurious, because it is entirely
groundless. For when these pretended Disaffections were
at the highest, it appear'd how impotent they were, how
far from being universal, by the easy and sudden Suppression of the Rebellion; and by Consequence how absolutely his Majesty reign'd in the Hearts of his Subjects.
Now the Rebellion is suppress'd, if there should be any
Remains of those who are ill dispos'd, the Fate of their
Friends, whilst the Terror of it is fresh in their Minds,
will restrain them from any future Attempt. Besides, the
Hands of the Government are strengthen'd. The HabeasCorpus Act is not only now, but may be again suspended:
You have a numerous standing Army distributed thro' the
Kingdom, to controul and awe unruly Spirits. But suppose the Disaffections of the People to be as great, suppose
the Faction, spoke of in the Preamble, to be as restless and
designing, as is affirm'd; is this the Way to extinguish Animosities, to heal Divisions, and to reconcile Parties? No,
Sir, it will rather create Discontents, where there are none
already: It will rather give Occasion to those that are disaffected, to rail at your Proceedings; to say, that your Actions
are such that you dare not venture on new Elections; and
who knows what such Suggestions may produce? 'Tis possible when the three Years, for which you are now chosen,
shall expire, they may insist, that they are unrepresented in
Parliament; and this will be a better Handle, a more plausible Foundation, for the Faction to work upon, than they
could have at the Time of a regular Election. Now, if the
Continuance of this Parliament be intended only to calm
Men's Minds, and that it is hop'd this Storm may by Degrees
subside, Gentlemen will be pleas'd to consider, that we are but
a little above a Year old, though we have done so many
great and glorious Things, and that there will be no Necessity, as the Law stands, of a Dissolution this Year and half;
and that no Body can imagine Discontents will last so long
under so wise, so unerring, so pacifick an Administration, as
we now enjoy.
'Another Reason insisted on, is, That as the Continuance
of this Parliament may prevent Commotions at Home, so it
may hinder any Invasion from Abroad, by encouraging our
ancient Allies to enter into new Treaties with us, which they
will not otherwise do.
'This is a Secret which, in my humble Opinion, ought
not to have been revealed; this is an Argument highly improper to be urg'd in a British Parliament: For it supposes,
that our Allies prescribe to our Counsels, and that they expect we should alter the present Frame of our Constitution,
before they will favour us with their Friendships; which is a
Thought not to be endured in this Place, where so many
Millions have been raised for their Service, and must move
the Indignation of every Englishman, especially if it comes
from any State that first receiv'd its Being, and afterwards
its Protection, from England. I hope never to see this Nation brought so low, that the Crown shall be directed, as
was once attempted, when to remove or keep its Ministers,
when to dissolve or continue its Parliaments. Sir, his Majesty, as King of Great Britain, is the Arbiter of Europe, and
may dictate to other Nations. They will, for their own
Sakes, court his Friendship; they have always found their
Account in being Allies to the Crown he wears. The British Treasure, and the British Armies, have made them triumph over their Enemies, and establish the Balance they
wanted. 'Tis farther said, that by this Bill you will restore
the Prerogative to part of its Power, which is cramp'd by
the Triennial Act. Now, if this Bill is to be understood to
relate to Alliances, it weakens and not strengthens the Prerogative. For it is an Insinuation, that the People have
something to do in making Treaties, which must ever be
deny'd by the Friends of the Crown, where the sole undisputed Right is lodg'd by the Constitution of this Kingdom.
Besides, if that was any Consideration here, this Argument
is also a Reflection on the present Ministry, who are to have
the Honour to advise his Majesty in any Alliances he shall
think fit to make: For it hath an Appearance, as if they
durst not look a new Parliament in the Face; or, as if by
some Demerit or other, they should not continue in their
Posts, without the Help of this Bill, long enough to assist
in supporting those Alliances when made. 'Tis true, we
have had of late a Sort of Triennial Ministers, as well as
Parliaments. But we are to hope, that the present Set of
Ministers, who so far surpass all their Predecessors in Wisdom and Virtue, will behave so well, as to deserve the Continuance of his Majesty's Favour, and the Kingdom's Approbation. Their Friends ought therefore rather to reject, than
to inforce this Argument, as reflecting on them, and groundless in it self.
'There is another Reason, drawn from the great and continu'd Expences occasion'd by frequent Elections, which is
so weak, that it scarce deserves to be taken Notice of. For
every Gentleman is a Judge of his own Circumstances, whether he will or can be at the necessary Expences of an Election: Corrupt ones are not to be suppos'd, especially in this
House, which, all the World knows, was chosen without
the least Corruption, without the least Violence, without the
least improper Influence whatsoever.
'As to what is said, That frequent Parliaments are the
Cause of obstructing Justice, and hinder Candidates from being impartial in the Distribution of it; 'tis equally trifling
with the Reason last mentioned; and, if any, is an Argument only for making Parliaments perpetual. For he who
will be a great deal byass'd by his Hopes of securing his Seat
in a Triennial Parliament, will, by the same Principle, be
a little warp'd by his Expectation of sitting in a Septennial
one; and he ought in neither Case to be a Member of this
House; For nothing can effectually cure such a Disposition;
it will never be able to resist greater Temptations, and CourtPreserments.
'These are the chief Arguments for passing this Bill; and
I humbly conceive they now appear to be of no great Weight:
But the Reasons for letting the Law stand as it does, are such
as, in my Opinion, cannot receive an Answer.
'First, If there were not abundance of other Arguments
against this Bill, the Manner of its coming hither, is a sufficient Objection to it. 'Tis sent from the Lords, and as it
chiefly relates to our selves, I shall apprehend it inconsistent
with our Honour to receive it. We ought to imitate the
Spirit which our Predecessors ever shew'd in resisting all Attempts of this Kind, all Appearances of Innovation by the
Lords. Our Predecessors were so very jealous of their Privileges, that they never fail'd to exert themselves, even on the
smallest and most minute Occasions. Shall we then! shall
this glorious House of Commons be so far from doing that,
as humbly to take a new Model of our Constitution from
them? Surely we shall not fit tame, and acquiesce meanly,
when they think fit to strike at the Foundations of this
House.
'But if any here could be inclinable to receive the Dictates of the Lords, or, to speak out, the Dictates of the Ministry, I humbly apprehend it is not in our Power to consent
to this Bill. For I cannot conceive, by any Rule of Reason
or Law, that we, who are only Representatives, can enlarge
to our own Advantage the Authority delegated to us; or
that, by Virtue of that Authority, we can destroy the Fundamental Rights of our Constituents. I know indeed, that
the Notion of the radical Power of the People hath been extended to a Degree of Extravagance and Absurdity, which
I would never be suppos'd to contend for. But it is selfevident, that this Power with Relation to the Part we bear
in the Legislature, is absolutely, is solely in the Electors.
You have no Legislative Capacity, but what you derive from
them. You were chosen under the Triennial Act, and could
only be chosen for three Years, unless they could convey
more to others, than they had in themselves; unless they
could give us a longer Term to represent them, than they
could claim at the Time of their Choice to be represented.
Our Trust therefore is a Triennial Trust; and if we endeavour to continue it beyond its legal Duration, from that Instant we cease to be the Trustees of the People, and are our
own Electors; from that Instant we act by an assum'd Power,
and erect a new Constitution. If we could dissolve or alter
the Form of any one Part of the Legislature, why not of the
whole? And that is a Doctrine I presume will not be advanced
here; I am sure it will never be allow'd in any other Place.
But I know it is a very unacceptable Way of Speaking, to
dispute the Power of those to whom one speaks; and it may
be thought a Presumption if I should affirm in this present
Parliament, which hath given so many Proofs of its Omnipotence, that even the whole Legislature cannot do every
Thing. I must however always be of Opinion, that tho'
it is a receiv'd Maxim in civil Science, that the supream Legislature cannot be bound; yet an imply'd Exception must
be understood, viz. that it is restrain'd from subverting the
Foundations on which it stands; and that it ought not, on
any Pretence whatsoever, to touch or alter those Laws, which
are so far admitted into the Constitution, as to become essential Parts of it. I am also of Opinion, that we cannot pass
this Bill, because it would be an Infraction of the Act of
Union, which I hear almost every Day in this Place call'd an
irrepealable and Fundamental Law. But since the Representatives of North Britain are satisfy'd in that Point, it would
be highly impertinent in me to infist upon it.
'But if nothing stood in your Way, if it was never so
much in your Power, I think you ought not to repeal the
Triennial Act, except in the last Extremity, and in the most
imminent Danger of the State. This Law was one of the
Fruits of the Revolution: This Law restor'd the Freedom
and Frequency of Parliaments, so far as was consistent with
the Circumstances of that Reign, which was involv'd in a
War, and had Occasion for constant and heavy Taxes:
This Law was a Concession made to the People by King
William, in the midst of his Difficulties; and I own the
Policy of those Ministers, who shall advise his Majesty to
give his Royal Assent to the repealing of it, is of too refin'd and delicate a Nature for my Understanding. For
since his Majesty has been pleas'd to propose that Prince as
a Pattern to himself, and is pursuing his Steps with so much
Glory, it will be a Matter of Astonishment to those who
are not in the Secret of Affairs, to see, that in the Reign of
the one King every Thing should be done to enlarge the
Liberties of the People, and to restrain his Successors from
being capable of relapsing into the Errors and Abuses of
former Princes; and that in the Reign of the other, there
should be the least Appearance of doing any Thing which
might but seem to stretch the Prerogative, to invade, and
shock the Rights and Privileges of the Subject, when both
shall be found to rule by the same Principles of Liberty,
and by the same Maxims of Government.
'The Triennial Act is grounded on the ancient Usage
and Constitution of Parliaments; as it is intended to oblige the Crown to call them frequently. For, that Parliaments were held frequently, half yearly, or annually at
least, appears not only from the best Accounts we have
of the first Institution of them, and by the two Acts of Edward III, but by the Writs of Summons still extant, and
by several authentick Instruments and Records. However
satisfactory it might be on any other Occasion, I am sensible
that a Deduction of the History of ancient Parliaments, as
they were successively call'd, would be very tedious and
unentertaining in this Debate; and I will therefore only
mention two Records. One is that famous Instrument of Edward I, concerning the Annuus Census, then claim'd by the
Popes from the Crown of England; wherein he takes Notice, that some Arrears, incurr'd on that Head, had not
been rais'd, as they ought to have been in Parliamento, quod
circa Octavas Resurrectionis Dominicæ celebrari in Anglia
consuevit: But he promises that he would recommend the
Payment of the Money due, in alio Parliamento xostro, quod
ad finem Sancti Michaelis proxime futuri intendimus; dante
Domino, celebrare. The other Record is a Representation
from the Parliament to Richard II, some Passages of which
are these — Quod ex antiquo Statuto habent, & Consuetudine
laudabili & approbata, cujus contrarietati dici non volebit.
That the King is to call Dominos & Proceres Regni atque
Communes semel in Anno ad Parliamentum suum, tanquam ad
summam Curiam totius Regni. That if the King—a Parliamento suo se alienaverit sua sponte, non aliqua infirmitate aut
aliqua alia de causa necessitatis, sed per immoderatam voluntatem proterve se subtraxerit per absentiam temporis Quadraginta
Dierum, tanquam de vexatione Populi sui & gravibus expensis
eorum non curans, ex tunc licitum omnibus & singulis eorum
absque Domigenio Regis redire ad propria, & unicuique eorum in
Patriam suam remeare.
'From the former of these Records, 'tis obvious to observe, that Edward the I, who was one of our best Princes,
and so great a Preserver of the Laws of his Kingdom, that
he is justly call'd by the Historians the English Justinian,
chose, rather than to prolong the Sitting of his Parliament
beyond their usual Time, to dissolve one, tho' it had not
finish'd its necessary Business, and to summon another within the Space of a few Months.
'From the other 'tis very remarkable, that Richard II.
who is said to be one of the worst Kings that ever sat on the
Throne of England, by absenting himself from the Business
of Parliaments, and by that Means continuing their Sessions
beyond their proper and accustom'd Time, drew upon himself a sharp Remonstrance from both Houses, and was at last,
for such Practices, amongst other Things, depos'd.
'Many Reigns after this, Henry VIII. accomplish'd what
Richard II. only attempted, and he continu'd his last Parliament ad libitum without Reproof. But 'tis well known what
exorbitant Powers they vested him with; and God forbid we
should have any Resemblance of those Times; for that Parliament acted like Slaves, and that King acted like a Tyrant.
'But if the Triennial Law had not been grounded on the
Reasons of Antiquity, and the original Usage of Parliaments,
it was more than a reasonable Indulgence from the Throne
to the People, who had struggled for a Revolution, on Account of the Abuses of Parliaments, and the Endeavours to
render them insignificant. 'Tis true, that Prince once deny'd his Royal Assent to it: But afterwards he consider'd,
that it could be no Diminution of his Prerogative, no Blemish to his Regal Power, to retrieve the Honour and Dignity of Parliaments, as they were his Support, as they were
the essential Part of that Constitution he came to save; and
this he found he could only do by the frequent Calling of
them.
'Besides, this Law was not only a reasonable Indulgence
to the People, as hath been said, in that it gave them frequent Opportunities of changing their Members, when they
did not approve their Behaviour, and was of Advantage to
the Publick, in making them act with more than ordinary
Caution and Circumspection; but it prov'd of great Service to
the Crown: For by frequent Parliaments the Crown could
only know the immediate Sense of the Nation, which is absolutely necessary for a Prince to know on all Emergencies.
However inconvenient this Law may now be thought to the
Crown, and however opposite to some Projects and Schemes
an active Ministry may have in View, I appeal to experienc'd
Members whether they think, or can imagine, that the
Crown could have got half the Money it hath been supply'd
with since the Revolution, but by new and fresh Elections.
Such grievous and perpetual Taxes would never have been
endur'd from a stale and continu'd Parliament. There is no
Injury or Dishonour therefore to the Crown, to be oblig'd,
by a Law, to do what, in Justice to the Subject, and Convenience to itself, it ought to do without a Law.
'But if you had a Power to repeal this Law, and exercise
that Power, the People would be in a much worse Condition,
than if it had never been granted to them. They would be
be bound up for ever in a Legislative Way, the only Way
effectually and irrecoverably to lose their Liberties. They
would by us, their Representatives, condemn short and frequent Parliaments, and establish long and pension'd ones,
which is a new Doctrine, and such as was never before advanc'd by the Commons of Great Britain.
'Surely there must be some secret Cause, some Intent Reason for hurrying on this Bill in so precipitate a Manner. The
true Reason, I believe, is not declar'd; and for my Part, I
cannot but suspect, that the Ministry have something to do
which they apprehend will not be acceptable to a new Parliament, and which will not stand the Test of the Nation. I
say, it must be something they have to do; for I am confident they do not self ecndemn themselves, for what they
have already done. They have no Remorse of Conscience
for apprehending so many hundred Gentlemen, and confining
them in Prison so many Months without Examination. For
such Confinements were not only necessary to suppress the Rebellion, but we have been told were intended as a Favour and
Kindness to the Persons who were so confin'd. It must therefore be some new Work they have upon their Hands; what
that Work is, I will not presume to guess. But I will presume to say, what it cannot be. It cannot be a Design to
abolish the Limitations of the Act of Settlement, with Relation to Foreigners; because that is no less than an open Violation of our new Magna Charta, and an entire Infraction
of our original Contract, as the Government now stands.
'I fear I have quite wearied your Patience, but the Importance of the Subject will in some Measure excuse me, and
I have but a very few Words now to add. I hope you will
reject and not commit this Bill. For there is nothing more
certain, than that it will be to your Dishonour and Disservice to pass it, if we may reason of what will be, by what
hath been. Long Parliaments then will naturally grow either
formidable or contemptible.
'We have an Instance of the one, in the long Parliament of King Charles First, which to its eternal Infamy
overturn'd the best Constitution in the World, the Church
and Monarchy of this Nation.
'We have a Proof of the other in the long Parliament of
King Charles the Second. I ask Pardon if I am heard by
any that were Members of it, but I only repeat what others
have said. There was a famous Simile apply'd by (Julian)
Johnson to that Parliament, which I the rather mention, because it was much applauded by the Patrons of Liberty, and
Lovers of Parliaments; and because I know the Author is
esteem'd above his Deserts by some Gentlemen, who are now
debating for long Parliaments; 'tis this, 'That a standing
Parliament will always stagnate, and be like a CountryPond, which is over-grown with Ducks-Meat.
'I make no Application; no Man will, or can, with any
Colour of Truth or Reason, apply it to this Parliament.
This Parliament is so far from being a stagnating Pool, that
it might rather be compar'd to a rapid Stream, or an irresistible Torrent, which, if continu'd, will bear down all before it.
To this Speech of Mr. Shippen's, Mr. Hampden replied
as follows.
Mr Hampden's Speech for the Bill.
Mr. Speaker,
'The House is now enter'd on the Exercise of a Power,
which, of Right, and agreeable to the Constitution, belongs
to them: I mean that Branch of Power which they, as a Part
of the Legislature, have, of repealing Laws, or extending and
limiting them, in such Manner as shall appear to them most
conducing to the Service of their Country. As this Right of
altering the Laws does undoubtedly belong to the Legislature, it ought to be us'd with the utmost Regard: since 'tis
equally a Crime to enervate Laws that are found to be a Support to our Government, as to omit the abolishing or suspending such as have not answer'd their End when made, or,
which is worse, as have prov'd detrimental.
'It is a commendable Zeal, when Gentlemen in their Debates express a Tenderness for the existing Constitution of
their Country, and their Apprehensions of the least Innovation in the Frame of the Government; and I am not surpriz'd
that it is objected, in so popular a Manner, that the Passing
of this Bill for suspending the Law for the Election of Triennial Parliaments, is to sap the Foundation of our English
Liberties.
'But if, upon an impartial Enquiry, it shall appear, that
this Bill, which was made for the Benefit of the Nation, has,
in no Respect, answer'd the Purposes for which it was calculated when made into a Law, I presume it may be allow'd,
that the Danger in suspending it is more imaginary than real.
'And since it is as unjustisiable to be tenacious of a Matter that has no Argument to support it, as not to give Way to
what Experience has demonstrated, if this Bill should, in its
Consequences, be void of Proof of its answering the Ends for
which it was made, I hope it will not be so great a Crime to
suspend it, as it has, with Industry, been represented without
Doors.
'A principal Argument for continuing the Triennial Bill
is, that it is agreeable to the ancient Laws of this Nation,
that there should be frequent Parliaments. I find by the
Laws I have look'd over that Parliaments ought to be frequently held; but I find it no where laid down as a Fundamental Position of the Nature of this Constitution, that there
should be frequent Elections. If Gentlemen will look to the
Beginning of Parliaments, they will find, in the 4th, 5th, and
36th of Edward III, that, 'For Redress of divers Mischiefs
and Grievances which daily happen, a Parliament shall be
holden every Year or oftener, if need be.' Let it then be
consider'd in what Manner those Parliaments were held:
When a King met his Parliament, they us'd to sit ten or
twenty Days, and then were prorogu'd or dissolv'd; and
there were frequent Intermissions of Parliaments, none being
call'd for several Years. By looking over the Journals, we
find the Prorogations and Dissolutions of Parliaments.
'To come down to the Time of Henry VIII. few of
his Parliaments sat more than twenty Days, though there
was not a Parliament met every Year; and from the 7th
to the 25th of Henry VIII, there are no Journals, and,
consequently, we cannot tell in what Manner Parliaments
were held. Afterwards there were several Parliaments, but
not every Year, to the End of his Reign.
'A Parliament was call'd the first Year of Edward-VI,
and in five Years sat but four Months. In Philip and Mary
there were four Parliaments, but the Sessions extremely short.
From the 2d to the 5th, and from the 7th to the 13th of
Queen Elizabeth, no Parliament met, and from the 14th
to the 25th of Queen Elizabeth, the Parliament sat only
from the 8th of May to the 30th of June; and four Years
after, from the 8th of February to the 8th of March following; and in eight Years after, never sat to do Business
but were then dissolv'd. There were six other Parliaments
call'd in Queen Elizabeth's Time; but never sat long, unless that in the 39th of her Reign, which sat four Months.
'The Parliament in the first of James I, sat about four
Months, and in three Years after, sat about eight Days. That
Parliament was not dissolv'd 'till the 9th of James, but sat
twice or thrice only. There were three other Parliaments
in his Reign, but they met very seldom.
'The Sessions in K. Charles I, were much shorter than of
late Days, with very frequent Prorogations; and in the 16th
of his Reign an Act was pass'd, For preventing Inconveniences
by long Intermission of Parliaments; by which it was provided,
that a Parliament should meet every three Years; which
Law we find repealed in the 16th of Charles II, by reason
that the Provisions in the former Law were look'd upon as
a Derogation to his Majesty's just and undoubted Prerogative for calling and assembling Parliaments, and might be
an Occasion of manifold Mischiefs, and might endanger the
Peace of his People. The said Act is repeal'd, and a Provision made therein, that 'Because, by the ancient Laws of
this Realm, in the Reign of Edward III, Parliaments are to
be held very often; the Sitting and Holding of Parliaments
shall not be intermitted above three Years.' In this King's
Reign the long Parliament was held; and whatever Corruptions they were tainted with, they could never be accus'd of favouring the Cause of France, or attempting to
enslave their own Country.
'In the Reign of K. James II, that unfortunate Prince, a
Parliament was held in May 1685, and sat above two Months,
and was, at several Times, prorogu'd to November 1687.
Then the happy Revolution took Place; and in the Bill of
Rights, 1. Guliel. & Mariæ, it is declar'd and enacted, That
all the Rights and Liberties asserted and claim'd in the
said Declaration, are the true, ancient, and undubitable
Rights and Liberties of the People of this Kingdom, and
ought to be firmly and strictly holden and observ'd.' And
in the same Bill, among that long Catalogue of Grievances
which precedes the said Declaration, there is not the least
Mention made of Want of frequent Elections, but only that
Parliaments ought to be free. In the sixth of King William,
this now favour'd Bill for Triennial Parliaments was pass'd;
and upon this Occasion I cannot help observing, that it is
some Satisfaction, that the People abroad, who look upon
the Reign of that Prince as a Usurpation, should be fond of
any one Act that pass'd in that Time; and I hope from
hence, they may in Time be more reconcil'd to the Protestant Succession, which is in Consequence of that Revolution.
'If Gentlemen will look over the Writs of Summons,
and the Returns of those Writs, they will find no Mention
how long any Parliament is to last; but the Return makes
Mention of the Persons who are to serve in the Parliament
that is to meet, and be held at such a Time at Westminster.
It must be allow'd, that the Parliament is subject to the
Triennial Act while it subsists; and therefore the Advantages or Inconveniences of that Law ought chiefly to be
consider'd in the Matter now before us: And in Case an
Act be found prejudicial, if such a Veneration is to be
paid to a Law, as not to alter it, from any Conviction of
its being insufficient, or attended with ill Consequences, I
think the Legislature will become, in a Manner, useless.
I take the principal Matter to be, to examine what Benefit
has accru'd to the Nation by virtue of this Bill, and if the
Inconveniences do not outweigh all the Advantages?
'It is pretended, that by the Triennial Elections, the
People have an Opportunity of laying aside those Persons
with whose Behaviour in Parliament they are dissatisfy'd,
or such whom they apprehend to be under Court-Influences:
I desire it may be consider'd, how very few Examples there
are, of Persons, who having accepted Places, have not been
re-elected. The Reason is very obvious: Because the
People, who love Expences, judge that a Man who has a
Place of Profit, is much more capable of making an Expence, than he that has none. But supposing any Gentleman so wickedly dispos'd, as to sacrifice his Opinion to the
Lucre of a Place, does not such a Person, who has spent
five or six hundred Pounds at his Election, and his Circumstances not very able to bear it, come more prepar'd
for Court-Temptation, than if he had enjoy'd his Seat in
Parliament, and been free from the Trouble and Expence
of frequent Elections? I appeal to Gentlemen, if Expences
are not increas'd? And if any Instance can be produc'd
where they are abated, many more may be where they are
increas'd; so that the End of the Bill, in this Respect, is
no ways answer'd.
'It is said, that Expences being voluntary, it is the Fault
only of those who make them; but when we observe the
Contagion of Expences to be universally spread in the Kingdom at the Time of Elections, and a Dissolution of Manners occasion'd by such Expences, it is Time for the Legislature to interpose, and prevent the dangerous Consequences of such an Evil. Do Gentlemen consider the Distractions occasion'd by Election, and the Impossibility, considering the small Interval of Elections, to heal up those
Wounds which the Animosities of Parties have occasion'd;
so that 'tis little better than living in a continual State of
Warfare. This is a no less fatal than undeniable Consequence of this Bill, which was calculated for the Ease of
the Subject.
'Its said, the Reason of this Expedient, as it is call'd,
is because the Majority of this Parliament are Whigs:
And tho' 'tis allow'd that this Parliament has acted for the
Service of his Majesty and the Nation, the Proceedings of
the last Parliament are said to be as meritorious of the
King's good Opinion, and the Nation's as what this Parliament has done.
'It is much insisted on, that the Tories gave the Civil
List: That is true; But had they not given it, I believe
the King would not long have been depriv'd of it. 'Tis
said the King was receiv'd here with the universal Joy of
his People: Why did that Satisfaction cease so soon? Has
the King done any Thing to lose the Affection of so many
of his People? or have his Ministers? If his Ministers,
why has the Spirit of Patriotism been so much wanting in
Gentlemen, as not to represent to the King, or in this
House, the Crimes of those he employs in his Service? But
if no real Handle for these Discontents has been given by
King or Ministers, then those who pretended such a Zeal
for the King and his Service, at his Arrival here, acted
a hypocritical Part, and meant nothing less than what they
now make Professions of. Let us consider the present Situation of the Minds of the People, how exasperated one Set
of them are at the necessary Prosecutions of those, who so
fatally concerted the Ruin of their Country; and to what
Degree that restless Spirit influenc'd the People in the late
Rebellion; and how industriously a false and mistaken Cause
of the Church has been of late propagated in this Nation.
'From these and many other Circumstances of Affairs, and
other Symptoms of the ill Temper of the Nation, I think the
Disposition of the Peoples Minds far from being suitable to
the Business of an Election, but rather for a Restoration of
that Person, who the deluded People have been taught has
alone a Right to the Crown, and is to come to free you from
the Oppressions you now lie under.
'So much has been said concerning the Preparations
which the Regent is making, by extorting vast Sums from
the Subjects of France; and so much has been spoken concerning our Alliances, and the Necessity of applying our
selves to find out effectual Methods for discharging the publick Debts, that after so long a Debate, I shall not trouble
you with my Thoughts upon those Subjects.
'It must be allow'd, that the Nation has Obligation to
those Patriots who fram'd this Law, with a View and Expectation it would prove a secure Provision for the Liberty
and Ease of the Subject: But could those great and honest
Men have foreseen into what a degenerate State this Nation
would fall, they would have been convinc'd how insufficient
and Cobweb a Remedy such a Bill must prove; and they
would scarce have been content with leaving to Posterity a
Legacy, which Experience has shewn to be destructive, instead of any real Advantage to them.
'I humbly apprehend, that when Laws do not answer
their End, or prove prejudicial in their Consequences, 'tis
the Duty of the Legislature to interpose; and that the Suspension of this Bill is so far from being a Violation of our
Constitution, that it is the healing a Breach made in the
Constitution by those who obtain'd this Law.
'The Reasons why I am now for the Bill are,
'To dispose the People to follow their Callings and to
be industrious, by taking from them, for a Time, the Opportunity of distracting one another by Elections: To prevent such who have the Will, from the Power of giving
any new Disturbance to the Government: To prevent another Rebellion, there being just as much Reason to expect
one this Year, as there was the last: To check that evil
Spirit in those who have sworn to the King, and rose in
Arms against him, or abetted such who have: To discountenance that Spirit which lately did so far prevail in this
Nation, as to approve of a most ignominious Conclusion of
a successful War, by a ruinous Peace: To render fruitless
any concerted Project of the Regent, or any other foreign
Princes, to disturb this Nation at a Time when Elections,
or the Approach of them, have rais'd a Ferment in the
Minds of the People; and to procure to the Clergy an
Interval from being Politicians, that they may be the better able to take Care of their Flocks, in the Manner the
Scripture has prescrib'd.
'For these and many other Reasons, too long to enumerate at this Time, I am for the Commitment of this Bill.
Sir Richard Steele spoke next for the Bill as follows,
Sir Richard Steele's Speech for the Bill
Mr Speaker,
'It is evident that new chosen annual Parliaments were
never the Custom or Right of this Kingdom: It remains
therefore only to consider, now that there is a Law, which
makes Parliaments meet, as of Course, at such a stated
Time, whether the Period of three Years answer'd the Purposes intended by it? The Preamble to the Triennial Act
expresses, that it was introduc'd into the Constitution for the
better 'Union and Agreement of the King and his People;'
but it has had a quite contrary Effect; and Experience has
verify'd what a great Man [meaning the late Earl of Sunderland] said of it, when it was enacted, 'That it had made
a Triennial King, a Triennial Ministry, a Triennial Alliance.' We feel this in all Occurrences of State; and
they who look upon us from abroad, behold the Struggle in
which we are necessarily engag'd from Time to Time under
this Law. Ever since it has been enacted the Nation has
been in a Series of Contention: The first Year of a Triennial Parliament has been spent in vindictive Decisions and
Animosities about the late Elections; the second Session has
enter'd into Business, but rather with a Spirit of Contradiction to what the prevailing Set of Men in former Parliaments had brought to pass, than of a disinterested Zeal
for the common Good: The third Session languish'd in the
Pursuit of what little was intended to be done in the second; and the Approach of an ensuing Election terrify'd
the Members into a servile Management, according as their
respective Principals were dispos'd towards the Question before them in the House. Thus the State of England has
been like that of a Vessel in Distress at Sea: 'The Pilot and
Mariners have been wholly employ'd in keeping the Ship
from sinking; the Art of Navigation was useless, and they
never pretended to make Sail. It is objected, 'That the
Alteration propos'd is a Breach of Trust:' The Trust,
Sir, repos'd in us, is that of the publick Good; the King,
Lords, and Commons, are the Parties who exercise this
Trust; and when the King, Lords, and Commons exercise this
Trust by the Measure of the common Good, they discharge
themselves, as well in the altering and repealing as in the
making or confirming Laws. The Period of Time, in this
Case, is a subordinate Consideration; and those Gentlemen
who are against the Alteration, speak in too pompous a
Style, when they tell us, 'We are breaking into the Constitution.' It has been farther objected, 'that all this
is only giving great Power to the Ministers, who may
make an arbitrary Use of it:' The Ministers are indeed
like other Men, from the Infirmity of human Nature
liable to be made worse by Power and Authority; but this
Act gives no Addition to that Authority it self; though it
may possibly prolong the Exercise of it in them. They
are nevertheless responsible for their Actions to a Parliament;
and the Mode of enjoying their Offices is exactly the same.
Now, when the Thing is thus, and that the Period of
three Years is found, from infallible Experience it self, a
Period that can afford us no Good, where shall we rest?
The Ills that are to be done against single Persons or Communities are done by Surprize, and on a sudden; but good
Things are slow in their Progress, and must wait Occasion.
Destruction is done with a Blow; but Reformation is
brought about by leisurely Advances. All the Mischiefs
which can be wrought under the Septennial Act, can be
perpetrated under the Triennial; but all the Good which
may be compass'd under the Septential, cannot be hop'd for
under the Triennial. We may fear that the Ministers may
do us Harm, but that is no Reason why we should continue them under a Disability of doing us Good. For
these Considerations, I am unreservedly for the Bill.'
Then Mr Snell spoke against the Bill.
Mr Snell's Speech against the Bill.
Mr Speaker,
'We are told there is an absolute Necessity for the Bill
which is now before you, and that those who oppose it, are
no better than Friends to a Popish Pretender. But as I wish
as well to his present Majesty's Person and Government, as
the most zealous for his Service, I shall never resign my
Opinion to Words only, and betray my Trust to serve the
Purposes of a Ministry.
'I cannot but think this Bill, if it pass into a Law, will
highly infringe the Liberties of the People; and as I can by
no means assent to the Reasons that are offer'd to prove it
necessary, so I shall heartily give my Negative to it.
'I don't wonder to hear a Necessity urg'd for altering the
Constitution of our Parliaments, by those who have given up
their own.
This last Expression, which was suppos'd to be owing to
Mr Haldane's, a Scots Member, having declar'd for the Bill,
was resented by Mr (fn. 25) Thomas Smith, Member for Glasgow, &c. who said, 'That Mr Snell would not be so bold
as to speak those Words any where else.' He was seconded
by Lord Coningsby; and the Dispute being like to grow
warm, Mr Speaker interposed, and said, 'That all the
Members having the Privilege of explaining themselves, Mr
Snell ought to have the Liberty of so doing.' Hereupon Mr
Snell said, 'That he meant no personal Reflection on that
worthy Member, for that he spoke only of the Scots Nation
in general.' To which Sir David Dalrymple replied, 'That
Mr Snell's Explanation increased the Offence, instead of lessening it, and that he demanded Satisfaction.' — Some other
Members also calling out, 'To the Bar, To the Bar,' Mr
Snell excused himself, by begging Pardon for any unguarded
Expressions that might have escap'd him: Upon which the
Affair drop'd, and he went on as follows:
Sir,
'The chief Arguments made Use of for the Bill, as it repeals
the Triennial Act, and continues the present Parliament, are,
'To appease the groundless Annimosities of the People:
'To avoid Expences, which frequent Elections occasion,
to the impoverishing of many Gentlemen's Families:
'To obviate tumultuous Riots and Assemblies, which might
give a Handle to a second Rebellion: And, lastly,
'To further our Alliances abroad.
'How we can possibly expect to quiet the groundless Animosities of the People by this Bill, I must own, I am at a Loss
to imagine, unless stripping them of their most valuable Privileges, which they and their Ancestors have for many Ages
past exercis'd and enjoy'd, may be thought a proper Expedient
to reconcile their Affections, and endear the present Administration to them.
'The Expences at Elections are merely voluntary, and
if any one suffers by them he has none to blame but himself;
and I scarce believe Gentlemen to be serious in this Particular; for let us look but a little backward, and trace this mischievous Evil, this growing Corruption, that needs such an
extraordinary Remedy, to its Original, and we shall find it
has its Rise from the same Place whence the Remedy propos'd had its Beginning; and that former ill Ministries, the
better to forward their sinister Views, have, by sending their
Agents through the Kingdom at an approaching Election, debauch'd the People with the publick Money; to that Pitch
of Corruption we are now arriv'd. 'Tis otherwise impossible
to give an Account how so many Gentlemen are chosen to
serve in Parliament, in Counties and Places where they have
no visible Estates or Interest; nay, some perhaps whose
Names were never heard of in the County a Month before
the Election.
'The Rebellion is happily now at an End, and the Government so much better secur'd against Riots and tumultuous Assemblies, by the wholsome Laws provided by the
Wisdom of this Parliament, that little or no Danger can be
reasonably apprehended from thence; especially, if we consider the Number of Forces prudently quarter'd throughout
the Kingdom, sufficient to suppress the most daring Commotions that shall be attempted.
'The last Reason made Use of to prove the Necessity of
this Bill, is, that it will enable the Government the better
to treat and negotiate Foreign Alliances.
'But surely those who make Use of this as an Argument,
are Strangers to the Constitution of England; for by the
known and standing Law of the Land, the Right of making
Peace and War, Treaties and Alliances, are undeniably the
King's Prerogative; and the King may exercise that Right,
as to him seems best, and most for the Good and Benefit of
his People, without Application to Parliament, either to approve or confirm. But admitting that of late Years Parliaments have thought themselves intitled to interpose their Advice in Treaties and Alliances, though I deny it to be their
Right, this is an Argument singly sufficient with me to support the Triennial Bill. For supposing a Ministry shall at
any Time negotiate an Alliance prejudicial to the Interest of
England, and by their Artifice impose upon a Parliament
to approve and confirm it; is it not a peculiar Happiness,
that such a Parliament will quickly have an End; and that
the People have it in their own Power, by another, which
must soon be call'd, to correct the Misdeeds of such a Ministry, and prevent the farther ill Consequences of such a Treaty to the Nation.
'But allowing the Arguments that are made Use of sufficient to prove the Necessity of repealing the Triennial Bill at
present, I would beg Leave to consider, whether it be in our
Power or no, to continue the present Parliament beyond the
Time for which the People chose us?
'And as for my own Part, I freely declare it as my Opinion, though I shall always acquiesce in the Judgment of the
Majority, that the Purport of this Bill, so far as it relates to
the Continuance of this present Parliament, is not within the
Compass of the Trust reposed in us by the People. And to
satisfy Gentlemen that I am not singular in this Opinion, I
would beg their Patience to read to them a Passage or two
from Mr Lock's Treatise of Government.
'The Power of the Legislative, says be, being deriv'd from
the People by a positive voluntary Grant and Institution,
can be no other than what that positive Grant convey'd;
which being only to make Laws, and not Legislators, the
Legislative can have no Power of transferring their Authority of making Laws, and placing it in other Hands.
Again, he lays it down as a Rule, 'That when the Society has plac'd the Legislative in any Assembly of Men,
to continue in them and their Successors, the Legislative
can never revert to the People whilst that Government lasts;
because, having provided a Legislature with Power to continue for ever, they have given up their Political Power to
the Legislative and cannot resume it: But if they have set
Limits to the Duration of their Legislative, and make this
Supreme Power in any Person or Assembly only temporary;
at the Determination of the Time set, it reverts to the Society, and the People have a Right to place it in new Hands.
'I beg Pardon for the Length of the Quotation; but as
the Author, in his Life-time, was always esteem'd a Man of
great Learning and Candour, and no ways suspected as disaffected to the Succession in the House of Hanover, I could
not omit taking Notice of the Sentiments of so great a Man,
so conducive to a right Understanding of the Point now in
Question.
'And if these Positions are true, the Inferences are very
obvious: The People of England have a Fundamental indisputable Right to appoint their Representatives in Parliament; and by a Law still in Being, for three Years and no
longer, subject to the King's Power of Dissolution, have
chosen us their Representatives, in Pursuance of that Law;
and therefore, whenever that Triennial Term shall expire,
have a Right to chuse new ones.
'It may be objected, That when the People have once
constituted the Legislative, that the Legislature is thereby
vested with the whole Power of their Electors: And it cannot be deny'd, but, generally speaking, it will hold true. And
the People of England, having chosen us to represent them,
we are thereby impower'd, not only to make Laws, but to
alter or repeal any Law in Being, as we shall think fit, for
their Benefit and Security; and they will undoubtedly be
bound thereby. But then this is to be understood, where the
Subject-Matter of the Laws we make is within Compass of
the Trust which the People have or may at least be suppos'd
to delegate to us; and it is an ill Way of Reasoning to assert, that we have a Power to do what we cannot do without
Prejudice to those we represent.
'The Right of electing Representatives in Parliament, is
inseparably inherent in the People of Great Britain, and can
never be thought to be delegated to the Representatives, unless you'll make the Elected to be the Elector; and, at the
same Time, suppose it the Will of the People, that their Representatives should have it in their Power to destroy those
that made them, whenever a Ministry shall think it necessary
to screen themselves from their just Resentments: This would
be to destroy the Fence to all their Freedom; for if we have
a Right to continue our selves one Year, one Month, or Day,
beyond our Triennial Term, 'twill unavoidably follow, we
have it in our Power to make our selves perpetual; and whatever Necessity we may be reduc'd to hereafter, Matters are
not yet in that apparent bad Condition, to convince the People
that there is a present Occasion for this dangerous Innovation in their Constitution.
'To say that the passing this Bill is not to grasp to our
selves the Right of Election, but only to enlarge the Time for
calling new Parliaments, is a manifest Fallacy; for whenever
our three Years are expir'd, we can no longer be said to subsist by the Choice of the People, but by our own Appointment; and 'tis a Jest to tell me, I have a Right to that which
another has a Right to take from me.
'Whoever will consider well the Frame and Nature of our
Constitution, will find it calculated for every Circumstance
needful for the Security of a free People. We are guarded,
by our Representatives in Parliament, against any arbitrary
Encroachments of the supreme executive Power; and by
frequent and new Parliaments, against the Weakness, Folly,
and Corruption of our Representatives: And tho' many Instances may be given of long Intermissions of Parliaments,
yet that does by no means prove frequent and new Parliaments
not to be Part of our Constitution; and 'tis obvious to every
impartial Person, that without them our Constitution is defective. For these Reasons I cannot approve of this Bill: I
think it an open Violation of the People's Liberties, or, to
speak most mildly of it, a Breach of our Trust in that Part
which will most sensibly affect them; and of that ill Tendency in its Consequence, that as nothing but the Security of the
Ministry can make it at this Time needful, so nothing but a
standing Force can make it lasting.
Mr Bromley spoke next against the Bill.
Mr Bromley's Speech against the Bill.
Mr Speaker,
'I may venture to affirm, that the Bill now before you is
of higher Concern to the Commons of Great Britain, than
any that ever yet was before you: It takes away the People's
Right of appointing their Representatives; it deprives them
of their Share in the Legislature, and, in my Opinion, wounds
the Constitution of Parliaments very deep.
'No Gentleman is ignorant, that the Frame of our Government is made up of the King, the Lords, and the Commons. These, with Respect to each other, have ever been
esteem'd separate, altho', when put together, they make but
one entire Government. The Duration of this Form of
Government in England, longer than in our neighbouring
Countries, is manifestly owing to the Care taken by those
that went before us, in keeping these three Constituent Parts
of the Political Body up to the Rules of their first Institution,
by restraining Each to its proper Bounds, and in not suffering
One to be over-born or swallow'd up by the other two:
However these Three great Parts may in other Respects be
consider'd, yet with Regard to the Legislative they must act
in Conjunction. The Assent of Each to the Making of Laws
is essentially necessary; but the Manner of giving this Assent
is different in the People, from what it is in the King, and in
the Lords. The People, by Reason of their Number, cannot be personally present at the passing of Laws; their Assent
can no otherwise be signify'd, than by their Representatives.
The Disadvantage the Commons are, in this Respect, under,
is in some sort made up to them by the Care taken in the
Framing of our Government, That they should be truly and
fairly represented.
'That Elections shall be free, is often declared in our
written Laws. 'Tis in Effect saying, That neither the Power
of the Crown, nor the Power of the Lords, should interpose
in them.
'The Resolution of this House, renew'd every Session,
viz. 'That for a Lord to concern himself in the Election of
Members to serve for the Commons in Parliament, is a
high Infringement of the Liberties and Privileges of the
Commons of Great Britain,' sufficiently shews the Jealousy
the Commons ever had of the Lords intermeddling in the
Elections of their Representatives.
'The Attempts made on the King's Part, towards influencing Elections, have been principally by Officers under the
Nomination of the Crown. As this Mischief from Time to
Time appear'd, Laws were introduc'd providing against it.
The Statute 7 Hen. IV. c. 15. recites that Law to be
made 'At the grievous Complaint of the Commons of the
undue Elections for Parliament,' and directs, among other
Things, 'That Sheriffs should proceed to Elections freely and
indifferently, notwithstanding any Command to the contrary.' Many subsequent Laws were made for preserving
to the People this Privilege, on which all other depend, of
being faithfully represented in Parliament. No less than
seven Acts were made in King William's Time for that Purpose: So greatly did the Endeavours of Officers to influence
Elections at that Time abound. The Statute of 3. Will. and
Mar. c. 1, takes Notice, 'That the Officers of the Excise,
by Reason of the Greatness of the Duty, and the extraordinary Powers given to them, had frequently, by Threats
or Promises, so far prevail'd on Electors, that they had
been absolutely debarr'd of the Freedom of giving their
Votes; which, according to the known Constitution of this
Kingdom, every Person ought to have and enjoy.' It then
enacts, 'That any such Officer who perswades or disswades
any Elector from giving his Vote, shall forseit one hundred
Pounds, and be incapable of executing any Office relating
to the Excise.' Another Law of the like Nature was lately
made in Relation to the Officers concern'd in collecting
the Post-Office Duty. These Laws are now all to be laid
asleep. Provisions made for protecting the People's Right
of Election must become insignificant, if Elections themselves are no longer to be allow'd.
'The Care taken by the Founders of our Government to
preserve this Right, did not stop here; it was not sufficient
to that Purpose, that Elections should be free; it was likewise necessary that they should be frequent.
'The People's Right to frequent Elections was founded
on substantial Reasons; for since they, who could act no otherwise than by Representatives, were capable of being mistaken in their Choice, and the Person chosen liable to be
tempted over to a Dependence on the Crown, or on the Lords,
and thereby receive an undue Influence, it became necessary
that frequent Opportunities should be given to the Commons
to correct their Choice, and thereby prevent the Danger
which the Unfaithfulness of their Representatives might
otherwise bring upon them.
'That the People had a Right to frequent Elections, is
made unquestionable by the best of Evidence, Perpetual
Usage.
'From the first Footsteps of Parliaments, down to the Time
of K. Henry VIII, not only from Records, but from the printed Statutes, the Frequency of Elections does appear. The most
repeated Instances, within that Period of Time, are of Parliaments determining within the Compass of a Year; no Instance where they continu'd longer than three.
'King Charles I, that unfortunate Prince, was put upon
governing without Parliaments; but the Necessity of Affairs
forcing him to change his Purpose, a Parliament was call'd
in the 16th Year of his Reign, in which a Law of an extraordinary Nature was pass'd, viz. 'That in case the King did
not call a Parliament within three Years after the Determination of the preceding Parliament, then the Lord
Chancellor, &c. should issue Writs for that Purpose;' with
many other extraordinary Provisions. That Parliament soon
after perpetuated themselves, so far as it was capable of being done; and by an Act made the same Year, 'they were
not to be dissolv'd but by Act of Parliament.' To the long
Continuance of which Parliament were all the Calamities of
the Civil War to be imputed.
'This Statute of the 16th of Charles I was repeal'd by the
Statute of the 16th of Charles II. c. 1. But notwithstanding
the fond Humour the Nation was then in, even by the same
Act it was declar'd, 'That by the Laws of this Realm, Parliaments are to be held very often, and to the End there
might be a frequent Calling, Assembling, and Holding
Parliaments once in three Years at least, it was declar'd
and enacted, 'That Parliaments should not be intermitted above three Years at the most.
'In King Charles II. Time another Turn of Policy was
taken, which was to bring the House of Commons to the Bent
of the Ministry, by the secret Application of Pensions to
the Members. Such was the Modesty even of that Age,
as not openly and avowedly to byass with Offices, those
who ought at least to be the faithful Representatives of the
People.
'For the effecting of this pernicious Purpose of corrupting the Commons, it was necessary that the Parliament
should be prolong'd; which it was for eighteen Years: Assurance of which being privately given to many of the
Members, and there being Time sufficient to gain upon
others, not so far intrusted with the Secret, the Design was
effected. And such was the Behaviour of that Parliament,
that it acquir'd the infamous Name of the Pensioner-Parliament.
'The Attack thus made on the Constitution of Parliaments, by depriving the People of their Right of frequent
Elections, gave Birth to the Jealousy the Nation entertain'd,
of the Intention that Prince had of assuming to himself a
despotick Power. How uneasy the later Part of his Reign
became on that Account, is well known; and this Nation
has felt the Effects of the Ferment and Divisions which then
arose; and by the Artifice of ill-designing Ministers, have
been ever since continu'd.
'The People being warn'd by the narrow Escape their
Liberties met with from that Parliament, did, after much
Struggle, obtain this Law of Triennial Parliaments, the only
Remedy left for preserving their ancient Constitution.
'And now, after above an hundred Millions given by
the People, in order to preserve their old Form of Government, here is a Bill sent us by the Lords, which, if it
passes, must expose us again to the greatest of Dangers,
which is that of a long Parliament.
'In the Time of that Pensioner-Parliament, which began
in 1662, the Means of Temptation in the Ministers Hands,
were not so great as they now are: The Civil List is well
nigh double to what it then was: The Dependence on the
Crown is greatly enlarg'd, by Reason of the Increase of
Officers for managing the publick Revenue and Funds.
What Influence these may have upon an exhausted Nation,
under the Terror which forty thousand regular Troops carry
with them, is easily foreseen.
'No Wonder the Lords, who are ever fond of Power,
have sent us a Bill which admits of their having a Share in
the Nomination of the House of Commons: But I can't
guess what should induce them to expect our Concurrence.
Surely they cannot think so meanly of us, that for the
Sake of continuing our Seats here, we should give into what
so greatly affects the Rights of those that sent us. Can
we be thought so ungrateful, as to join in the Destruction
of the Power that rais'd us? Can they think us so unfaithful, as to betray our Trust in this gross Manner, by renouncing our Relation to the People, and accepting from
the Crown, and from themselves, a Renewal of our Right
to sit here? Should they imagine us no longer to be influenc'd by the Rules of Justice and Morality; yet methinks
they should allow us to have some Sense of Shame remaining, which must give us Pain when we return into our
Countries, and look those in the Face whom we have so
greatly injur'd.
'I would take Notice of a Matter that was mention'd in
the Debate, viz. 'That supposing this Bill should undergo
the Forms us'd in the passing of Bills, whether it would carry
with it the Obligation of a Law? Of this I own my self
much in Doubt.
'The Powers we are intrusted with, as Representatives
of the People, appear in the Form of the Writ for summoning the Parliament. And in the Indentures annex'd to
the Return, the Writ recites, 'Whereas we have thought
fit to call a Parliament, touching divers urgent Affairs,
concerning Us, the State, and Defence of our Kingdom
of Great Britain,' It then requires, 'That the Sheriff do
cause two to be elected Knights, &c. to act in, and consent to what shall be ordain'd by the Common Council of
Great Britain, super negotiis antedictis.'
'The Indenture annex'd to the Return, answers the Writ,
viz. 'That they have elected such and such to attend according to the Tenor of the Writ, and given them full
Power to act in, and consent to, all Things in the said Parliament, which shall be by Common Council and Consent
ordain'd, touching the State and Defence of his Majesty's
Kingdom of Great Britain.' The Question then is, Whether the Authority thus given us to act, touching the Defence
of the Government, does enable us to lay aside one of the three
great Estates, the People, by denying them their Right of
acting by their Representatives in Parliament, and consequently their Share in the Legislature? Does the Power put
into our Hands by the People, justify our turning the Dagger into the Bowels of the Constitution? This Doubt is inereas'd by the Notion that prevail'd touching the Invalidity
of the Statute of the 16th Car. I. c. 7. whereby that Parliament was not to be dissolv'd but by an Act of Parliament.
No Act of Parliament was ever made for that Purpose;
which would certainly have been done, had the subsequent
Parliament thought that a Law made in Diminution of the
People's Interest in the Legislature had been valid, [It is to be
observ'd, that by an Act of the Convention that met in April
1660, the Long Parliament that met in 1640 was declar'd to be
dissolv'd: But that Act was not confirm'd by Parliament, as
most of the other Acts of that Convention were by the Statute of
the 13th Car. II. c. 7.]
'I should be very willing to hear answer'd what a worthy
Member who just now spoke for committing the Bill, and
own'd his Sentiments alter'd touching the Triennial Act, has
told the World in an excellent Treatise of his, [Meaning Mr
Molesworth, in his Preface to his Account of Denmark] 'That
no People can give away the Freedom of themselves and
their Posterity: That such a Donation ought to be esteem'd
of no greater Validity than the Gift of a Child, or of a
Mad-man: That People can no more part with their legal
Liberties, than Kings can alienate their Crowns.
'Every Body is sensible that the publick Occasions will require large Supplies; and should so much as a Doubt arise
in Men's Minds touching the Legality of the Taxes, it will
tend to increase the general Dissatisfaction, so often mention'd in this Debate, and subject us to Hazard there is no Occasion to run, did we content our selves with proceeding in
the common Methods, which the Usage of many Ages does
justify. For these Reasons I am against committing the
Bill.
After Mr Bromley, Sir Robert Raymond spoke likewise
against the Bill as follows.
Sir Robert Raymond's Speech against the Bill.
Mr. Speaker,
'I am very sensible under what Disadvantage I must
speak after so long a Debate: I will therefore endeavour to
contract what occurs to me on this Subject, and to avoid repeating what has been said before by other Gentlemen. And
in what I have to offer, I shall observe this Method; I will
first consider the Arguments that have been us'd for this Bill,
and then give my Reasons why I am against it.
'The Arguments for the Bill are, I think, chiefly these:
'The Expences in Elections.
'The Animosities and Divisions made and continu'd by
Triennial Elections.
'The Advantages our Enemies may take of these Animosities and Divisions: And
'The Encouragement, I think no Gentleman has spoke
plainer, that this Bill will give to our Allies to treat with us,
and to enter into proper Alliances, for our mutual Benefit
and Advantage.
'As to the Expences in Elections, it must be acknowledg'd
that they are grown very scandalous, as well as grievous and
burthensome to the Gentlemen of England. They have increas'd upon them, not from the Contests of neighbouring
Gentlemen with one another, but from Strangers, by what
Influence or Direction I cannot tell, coming to their Boroughs,
who have no natural Interest to recommend them, nothing
but Bribery and Corruption, which has put Gentlemen under
the Necessity of great Expences to preserve their Interests,
and serve their Country. And you must give me leave to
add, that another Cause has been, the Impunity that Bribery
and Corruption have met with in this House, when they
have been very notorious, and very fully detected. But, I
fear, this Bill can be no Cure to that Evil, it will rather increase it; for as the Term of the Continuance of a Parliament is prolong'd, so the Expences will increase with it. An
Annuity for seven Years deserves a better Consideration, than
for three; and those that will give Money to get into
Parliament, will give more for seven than for three Years.
Nothing will so effectually prevent Expences, as Annual Parliaments: That was our ancient Constitution, and every Departing from it, is usually attended with great Inconveniences.
'As for our Animosities and Divisions, I am sorry there
are any, but cannot believe this Bill will be a Remedy for
them. The Animosities and Divisions rais'd by Elections
are of a private Nature, and little affect the Publick; those
that do, are otherwise to be accounted for, which might have
been extinguish'd; but the Opportunities have been neglected, and I wish some Persons have not study'd rather to continue and increase them, than to extinguish them. I will
speak plainly on this Occasion. I think the greatest Animosities and Divisions, the greatest Discontents and Uneasinesses now among us, have been owing to the unreasonable
Resentments, Avarice, and Ambition of some, and to the unaccountable Folly and Madness of others.
'That our Enemies will take Advantage of our Divisions,
is not to be doubted, if it is in their Power; but I must observe, that since the Triennial Act pass'd, there have been
ten several Parliaments call'd, most of them when you were
actually in War, your Animosities and Divisions great, and
your Enemies vigilant; yet no Inconveniences follow'd, nor
were any, as I have heard of, so much as attempted at the
Times of those Elections.
'The last of the Arguments I have recited, is the Encouragement this will give to your Allies to enter into Treaties with you. No one says they want this Encouragement;
no one says they ask it; so that I may conclude this is only
a Pretence. I should be sorry we had such Allies as would
not treat with his Majesty without our giving up our Constitution. Should the like be ask'd of them, they would certainly entertain such a Proposition with the Contempt and Indignation it deserv'd. But what you are now going to do,
instead of strengthening the King's Hands, will, I am perswaded, lessen him in the Opinion of his Allies; for this is
proclaiming to the World, that he dares not call a new Parliament; that he dares not trust the People in a new Choice.
Besides, not daring to call a new Parliament, carries along
with it a Supposition to the Dishonour of this House; for it
supposes that another House of Commons would act differently from the present; which is to confess that this House
does not truly represent the People; that they and their
Representatives are of different Minds; and that if they
were to chuse again, they would chuse Men of other Principles, of other Sentiments.
'I will not trouble you farther with Answers to the Arguments for this Bill; those against it, that weigh most with
me, are these: That frequent new Parliaments are our Constitution; that a long Parliament is plainly destructive of the
Subject's just Right, and many Ways inconsistent with the
Good of the Nation. Is it reasonable any particular Men
should for a long Time engross so great a Trust, exclusive of
others; Can it be of Advantage to the Publick, that the
Counties, Cities, and Boroughs, should be long confin'd to
those they have once chosen, their Interests admitting of
great Variation in Length of Time?
'Frequent new Parliaments are our Constitution, and the
Calling and Holding of them was for many Ages the Practice. Before the Conquest, Parliaments were held three
Times every Year, at Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide.
In Edward the III, Time it was enacted, 'That Parliaments should be holden every Year once, or oftner if need
be.' This must be understood of new Parliaments, for Prorogations and long Adjournments were not then known; they
were never heard of 'till later Years. They began in Henry
the VIII, Time, that Prince and his Ministers knowing long
Parliaments were best fitted to make great Changes. They
were therefore Inventions when extraordinary Things were
to be done, when what was then the Church was to be alter'd,
and the Church-Lands to be taken away. There is nothing
of this Sort now, I hope, intended. From that Time our
Histories tell us, that when ever the same Parliaments were
long continued, or the Meetings of Parliaments long discontinued, they gave great Uneasiness. In the unfortunate Reign
of King Charles I, there had been an Intermission of Parliaments twelve Years, which produc'd an Act in the sixteenth Year of that King, For the preventing the Inconveniences
happening by long Intermission of Parliaments. That Act, in
the Preamble, recites the Law made in the Reign of Edward
the III, 'That Parliaments ought to be held every Year once;
but that the Appointment of Time and Place belong'd to his
Majesty and his Royal Progenitors: And that it had been
found by Experience, great Inconveniences and Mischiefs had
happen'd to the King, and to the Commonwealth, by not
holding Parliaments accordingly.' And for the Prevention of
the like for the future, it enacts, 'That the said Laws shall
be strictly observ'd; and that in case there be an Intermission of the sitting of Parliament for three Years together,
if there is a Parliament in being, that Parliament shall be
dissolv'd,' and very extravagant Powers were given for the
Calling and Assembling of another; 'And every such Parliament was not to be dissolv'd of fifty Days, without their
own Consent.' This extraordinary Step was soon follow'd,
by an Act intituled That the Parliament should not be dissolv'd,
prorogu'd, or adjourn'd, but by Act of Parliament; nor the Houses
of Parliament adjourn'd but by themselves respectively. I need
not be particular in recounting the Consequences of this Act of
Parliament; for every one knows, that Set of Men, when they
had thus continued themselves, never stopp'd 'till they had
murder'd the best of Princes, and entirely subverted our Constitution both in Church and State.
'Soon after the Restoration of King Charles II, the Act
for the preventing the Inconveniences happening by the long
Intermission of Parliaments was repeal'd, because derogatory
to the Prerogative, and because it might be an Occasion of
many Mischiefs and Inconveniences, and endanger the publick Peace and Safety; but at the same Time it is declar'd
and enacted, 'That because, by the ancient Laws and
Statutes, Parliaments are to be held very often, the sitting
and holding of Parliaments shall not be intermitted above
three Years at the most.' This Law not having been so
well observ'd, as it ought to have been at the Revolution in
the Convention-Parliament, when it was thought necessary to
declare the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, after many
Breaches had been made upon them, it was, among other
Things, declar'd, 'That Parliaments ought to be held frequently.' And what follows in that Act is very strong,
for it declares and enacts, 'That all and singular the Rights
and Liberties asserted and claim'd in the said Declaration,
are the indubitable Rights and Liberties of the People of
this Kingdom, and so shall be esteem'd, allow'd, adjudg'd,
and taken to be; and all the Particulars thereof shall be
firmly and strictly holden and observ'd, as they are express'd in the said Declaration.' The Right claim'd and
asserted, is, 'That Parliaments ought to be held frequently;
And soon after a new Parliament was call'd, which sate
annually: But this was not look'd upon to be a complying with the Right claim'd, and therefore, after that Parliament had sat three Times, in the fourth Session it was
thought necessary to come to a farther Explication, and a
Bill pass'd both Houses, but was rejected by the Throne,
For the frequent Meeting and Calling of Parliaments. Others
were attempted in the next Session, and it is well known how
they came to miscarry in this House; but in the succeeding
Session, a Bill pass'd both Houses, and had the Royal Assent. That is the Act this Bill is to alter: But before it is
alter'd, I hope it will be shewn, that what is asserted in the
Preamble, is mistaken, and has prov'd otherwise. In the
Preamble two Things are asserted, 'That by the ancient Laws
and Statutes of the Kingdom, frequent Parliaments ought to
be held; and that frequent new Parliaments tend very much
to the happy Union and good Agreement of the King and
his People. The first Proposition is incontestable; and the
latter, I think, will not be deny'd; for frequent and new
Parliaments create a Confidence between the King and his
People, a very necessary Step towards an Union and good Agreement. If the King would be acquainted with his People, and have more the Hearts of them, this is the surest
Way; and I am perswaded this House will never consent to
any Thing that may prevent the one, and intercept the other.
'I cannot entertain so unworthy a Thought of this
House, that any Gentleman in it would at this Time, in
direct Terms, be for perpetuating themselves; yet if they
consent to this Bill, I shall reckon they are doing it; for
tho' it only prolongs this Parliament for seven Years, I cannot doubt but hereafter there will be another for continuing
it longer; because, before the End of this Term, the Reasons will probably be stronger for it, than they are now.
Neither can I imagine that Gentlemen are afraid to trust
the Peoples Choice again: Do they think that the great and
memorable Things this Parliament has done for the Service
and Benefit of their Country, will make them less acceptable to the People? No one will say so; and then I see no
Reason why they should be for making this Alteration in
our Laws and Constitution, which will certainly have a very
ill Effect upon the Minds of the People: For they will be
ready to say, and with Reason, that after the Expiration of
the three Years, you are no longer their Representatives,
because they chose you to serve them no longer. With
great Submission I speak it, in my poor Opinion, King,
Lords, and Commons, can no more continue a Parliament
beyond its natural Duration, than they can make a Parliament. I know at extraordinary Junctures, Conventions
have been turn'd into Parliaments; but it has been thought
adviseable soon to determine them, and to pass Acts in the
subsequent legal Parliaments, to confirm what they have
done. And I make no doubt, but if this Bill passes into a
Law, and this Parliament is continued more than three
Years, there will be an Act in the succeeding Parliament to
confirm whatever shall be done after the three Years. There
is an Instance in your Statute-Book, where all the Acts of
a Parliament were declar'd void, and repeal'd, because the
Parliament was unlawfully summon'd, and the Members
not duly chosen.
'I need not urge farther, that the wisest Governments
that have preserved a Face of Liberty, have never continu'd
those long, with whom they have intrusted the supreme
Power.
'That by this Bill, you have all the Mischief of a long
Parliament, without any of the Good of a short one.
'That a standing Parliament and a standing Army are
convertible, and only necessary to support one another.
'And that there can be no Occasion for this Bill at this
Time, because this Parliament may have two more Sessions,
if the King pleases.
'But as I have already taken up so much of your Time,
I shall only add, that for the Reasons I have given, I am against committing this Bill.
These were the chief Arguments that were urg'd on
either Side, for and against the Bill; and upon the whole
Matter it was resolv'd, by a Majority of 284 against 162,
that the Bill be committed to a Committee of the whole
House.
Petitions presented against repealing the Triennial Act.; Debate concerning a Clause for preventing Pensioners from sitting in Parliament.
April 25. Two Petitions against the said Bill, one of
the Borough of Horsham, the other of Westbury, were presented to the House and read: The last of them was order'd to lie on the Table; but the House taking Offence
at an Expression in that from Horsham, viz. 'That they
look'd upon it as an Overturning of the Constitution, and
as an Infringement of their Liberties,' rejected their Petition. After this Mr Lechmere moved, and the Question
was proposed, That it be an Instruction to the Committee
of the whole House, to whom the said Bill was committed,
that they have Leave to receive a Clause, to disable Persons from being chose Members of either Houses of Parliament, who have Pensions during Pleasure, or any Number
of Years: But General Stanhope having represented, that
such a Clause would but clog the Bill, and endanger its Miscarriage, Part of it being derogatory to the Privileges of
the House of Lords; and that if any Jealousy were entertain'd of the Members of the House of Commons having
Pensions from the Crown, a Bill might be brought in to exclude them; the previous Question being put, that the
Question be now put, it passed in the Negative. Then the
House, in a Grand Committee, of which Mr Hampden was
Chairman, went thro' the Bill, and directed it to be reported
without any Amendment; which being done, the House
order'd it to be read the third Time the next Day. After
this General Stanhope moved, and it was order'd accordingly, That Leave be given to bring in a Bill to disable
any Person from being chose a Member of, or sitting and
voting in, the House of Commons who has any Pension
during Pleasure, or for any Number of Years, from the
Crown; and that General Stanhope, Mr Craggs, and Mr
Boscawen, do prepare and bring in the same.
More Petitions against repealling the Triennial Act.; Debate on the third Reading of the Septennial Bill.
April 26. Two Petitions against the said Bill, one of
the Borough of Caerdiffe, the other of Petersfield, being presented to the House, and read, were order'd to lie upon the
Table. After which, the Bill was read a third Time, and
upon. Mr Hampden's Motion, the Question was put, That
the Bill do pass, which occasion'd a Debate that lasted
about two Hours. Those who spoke against the Bill, were
Mr Freeman, Mr Hungerford, Mr Wykes, and Lord Finch,
who were severally answer'd by Sir Richard Steele, Mr
Boscawen, Sir William Thompson, Mr Erle, Mr Tufnell,
and Sir John Brownlow.
Mr Freeman and Mr Hungerford having, among other
Things, insisted, That no satisfactory Answer had yet been
made, either as to the Trust repos'd in the Commons by
their Principals, or as to the repealing the Triennial Act
Now, Mr Tufnell, Member for Malden, made thereupon
the following Speech.
Mr Tufnell's Speech for the Bill.
Mr Speaker,
'I think the only Question before us is, Whether the
Triennial Act, as it now stands, or as it is propos'd to be
alter'd by this Bill, is likely to conduce most to the Benefit
of the Publick? However, since in this Debate there has
been a good deal said of the Constitution of Parliaments, I
must beg Leave to mention a Word or two on that Subject.
'That Parliaments were anciently to be held annually,
appears by two Acts made, the one in the 4th, the other
in the 36th of Edward III, But tho' they were to be held
annually, or oftner if Occasion should be, in order to remedy the Grievances of the People, yet I can't find that there
ever was any Time limited for Elections: But as the
Crown had always the Power of dissolving, so likewise of
calling a Parliament whenever they thought fit. There was
indeed a Triennial Act made in the 16th of Charles I, To
prevent the Inconveniences which may arise by the long Intermission of Parliaments; and therefore it provided, 'That
'there should be a Session once in three Years;' but by no
Means limited any Time for the Duration of Parliaments.
This Act was repeal'd in the 16th of Charles II, because
there were some Provisions made in it, which were look'd
upon as a Derogation to the Rights of the Crown. I believe I may venture to say, the first Restriction which ever
the Crown lay under, as to the Continuance of Parliaments,
was in the 6th of William and Mary. Then sprang up the
Triennial Law, which is the Subject of our present Debate;
and which, however well design'd, was certainly an Innovation, 'till then unheard of. So that what is now offer'd in
this Bill, is only, in some Measure, to reinstate the Crown
in that Power which it had always enjoy'd. And I can't
but be surpriz'd, that those Gentlemen who have hitherto
boasted themselves to be the zealous Assertors of the Prerogative of the Crown, should of a sudden be so fond of a
Law which undoubtedly is a very great Diminution of it.
I hope I shall not be misunderstood, as if this were the only
Reason which induces me to approve of the present Bill;
No, though I shall always have a due Regard to the Prerogative, yet if I could imagine that this Bill would prove
the least Detriment to the Publick, the least Infringement
of the Liberties of my Fellow-Subjects, my Vote should
never flatter any Crown, so far, as to revive such a Prerogative.
'The Design of this Bill is only to enlarge the Time for
the Continuance of Parliaments, by making them Septennial
instead of Triennial. Of the Law, as it now stands, we have
already had the Experience about two and twenty Years; and
what Advantage have we gain'd? Has it ever answer'd one
single End for which it was intended ? On the contrary, has
it not produc'd the most mischievous Effects ? What endless
Divisions has it created among Neighbours, Friends, nay,
the nearest Relations? How has it ruin'd Gentlemen's Estates,
Made them not only Beggars, but Slaves to the very meanest of the People ? What a Scene of Corruption has it every
where introduced ? How has it debauch'd the Morals of the
Nation ? Even the Administration of Provincial Justice,
which has always been esteem'd the Glory of our Constitution,
has been infected: And I wish the Infection may have reach'd
no farther. These are some of the fatal Consequences we
have already experienced by this Triennial Law; and those
alone, in my humble Opinion, would be sufficient Reasons
for the Alteration of it. However, let us consider the present Circumstances of our Affairs. In order to it, let us a
little look back to the Original of our Misfortunes: And are
they not owing to that unreasonable Cry of the Danger of
the Church, under the specious Pretence of supporting the
Church of England, though manifestly in Favour of that of
Rome? That unhappy Delusion, which has been so industriously, so maliciously spread, and so fatally indulg'd ! Let us
consider that unnatural, unprovok'd Rebellion, which has
so lately rag'd among us; and that sullen groundless Spirit
of Discontent which still lies murmuring in so many traiterous Breasts. And notwithstanding that Indifference, nay Contempt, with which I hear the Argument of our Alliances treated by some Gentlemen, I must own I cannot but think there
ought to be a good deal of Stress laid upon it: For how can
we imagine, that any Foreign Powers will readily enter into
any Treaties with us, for our Advantage, without some Security that they shall be made effectual, as long as our Government is subject to such a Fluctuation, and as it were Triennial ? Especially if it be consider'd in how shameful and how
infamous a Manner the Grand Alliance was broken; the Faith
of Treaties violated; the Credit of this Nation sunk; its Interests betray'd; our ancient and best Allies abandon'd, and
ill treated; new ones sought for, and caress'd, with no other
Design, but to make us a more easy Prey to the Pretender ?
Nay, have we not too just Ground to suspect that this Cause
has all along been underhand supported by these very Allies,
the old inveterate Enemies of our Constitution, who are always envious of our Prosperity, and only wait a fair Opportunity to give us fresh Disturbances ? And could their Vigilance, their artful Management, and their Treasure, join'd
with the unwearied Endeavours of a restless Faction at Home,
procure an Election in their Favour, what would be the Consequence, but to unloose the Doors of your Prisons, to set
Traitors once more at the Head of your Affairs, to give them
an Opportunity of re-acting their former unfinish'd Scenes of
Treachery, to make you a tributary Province to France, and
for ever compleat the Ruin of these Kingdoms ? To see the
British Honour thus prostituted, the once Arbitress of Europe thus insulted; these Things, I say, ought to raise in
every British Breast a just Resentment of the Injuries of his
Country, After all, I am sensible there have been several
Objections made against this Bill, which carry an Air of Popularity with them; yet which, upon Examination, must appear to be of no real Weight. I shall take Notice of but
one or two of the most considerable, left I should trespass too
far on your Indulgence. It is said, our Electors chose us
their Representatives but for three Years, and that we can't
prolong the Term without betraying that Trust which they
have repos'd in us. In Answer to which I must desire Gentlemen to consider the Nature of the Writs of Summons, and
the Returns to them: Is it not to consult de Rebus arduis
Regni? and that they should have plenam & sufficientem Potestatem pro se et Communitate Comitatus prædicti, & prædictorum Civium & Burgorum, divisim ab ipsis, ad faciendum
quod de communi Consilio ordinari contigerit in Præmissis: Ita
quod pro defectu bujusmodi Potestatis Negotia prædicta infecta
non remaneant? Nay, may not the same Objection be made
against the repealing or altering any Law in Force at the
Time of an Election, and consequently defeat the very End
for which a Parliament is chosen ? And I should be glad to
know what particular Authority they were inverted with, who
made the Triennial Law, which was certainly a great Alteration of the Constitution ? There is another Thing which I
find is very much insisted on, and that is, Supposing this Bill
were reasonable, yet why now ? Because 'tis now there's the
most Occasion for it. Are we not every Day threaten'd with
new Insurrections, new Invasions ? And is it not the Prospect
of Success at the next Election, however ill-grounded, which
still keeps alive the Spirit of Jacobitism ?
'No Wonder then there are such Clamours rais'd without
Doors against this Bill, by the Enemies to our Government,
as well knowing that this must prove its best Security; that
it must effectually defeat their Measures; that it must strike
at the very Foundation of all their traiterous Designs; and
for ever blast the Pretender's Hopes of rekindling the Flames
of Rebellion. In short, I am so entirely convinced, not only
of the Reasonableness, but of the absolute Necessity of this
Bill, in order to put an End to our unhappy Divisions, to stop
that raging Deluge of Corruption which is so universally
spread throughout the whole Nation, to make the Crown sit
easy on his Majesty's Head, and perpetuate the Protestant
Succession in his Royal Family; and at the same Time, that
it is no ways prejudicial to the Rights and Liberties of the
Subjects of Great Britain; that how ill soever a Recommendation it may be to any future Election, if I can have but
the Pleasure to see my Country secur'd, to see these Blessings
fix'd upon a solid and lasting Foundation, and if I can have
but the Honour to contribute the least Share towards so glorious a Work, my Ambition will be sufficiently rewarded, tho'
I should, by this Day's Vote, for ever after be excluded a
Place in this House.'
The Lord Guernsey having, in the Course of this Debate,
asserted, 'That if a Man did not fall into all the Measures
of the Ministry, and lap with them like the Men of Gideon,
he was immediately Brow-beaten.' Mr Boscawen answer'd,
'That that honourable Member was of another Opinion not
many Weeks before; so that what he now said must proceed
either from Resentment or Disappointment.' Sir John
Brownlow said, 'That for his own Part, he neither expected
nor looked for a Place: That he would not have been for
this Bill during the last Ministry, because he was sure they
would have made an ill Use of it, but that he was for it
Now, because he was satisfied the present Ministers would not
abuse it.'
The Bill for repealing the Triennial Act passes the House.
Upon the whole Matter the Question being put, That the
Bill do pass, it was carry'd in the Affirmative by 264 Votes
against 121; and Mr Hampden was ordered to carry the
Bill back to the Lords.
Bill sent from the Lords, relating to High Treason, thrown out by the Commons.
May 2. The Lords having sent down to the Commons a
Bill, intitled, An Act for allowing of Counsel to all Persons
who shall be proceeded against in Parliament for any Crimes
of Treason, or Misprision of Treason; to which they desir'd the
Concurrence of the Commons, the said Bill was read the first
Time; and after some Debate, the Question being put, That
it be read a second Time, it pass'd in the Negative.
By this Bill Counsel for Prisoners, in Cases of High Treason, were to be permitted to speak to Matters of Fact as well
as Points of Law.
The Act, for restraining the King from going out of the Kingdom, repeal'd.
Nothing farther material happen'd in the House, during
this Session; but perhaps it may not be improper to take Notice, that the King having resolv'd to visit his German Dominions; and by the Act of Settlement his Majesty being restrain'd from going out of the Kingdom, without Consent of
Parliament, a Motion was made by Sir John Cope, and seconded by Mr Hampden, for bringing in a Bill to repeal
that Clause of the said Act; which Bill was accordingly
brought in Nem. Con. and past into a Law.
June 26. The King went to the House of Peers, and
the Commons attending, his Majesty gave the Royal Assent
to several publick and private Bills; after which the Lord
Chancellor read the following Speech deliver'd into his Hands
by his Majesty from the Throne.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
King's Speech at concluding the Session.
"I Cannot put an End to this Session, without expressing
to you my Satisfaction in the Proceedings of this Parliament. The wholesome and necessary Laws which have
been pass'd with so much Steadiness, Resolution, and Unanimity, will, I trust in God, answer those good Ends
which, it is evident, you have had in View, by defeating
the Designs and reducing the Spirit of our Enemies, by
encouraging our Friends, and raising the Credit and Reputation of the Nation Abroad to such a Degree, as that I
may reasonably expect the Fruits of a settled Government;
especially being supported by a Parliament zealous for the
Prosperity of their Country, and the Protestant Interest
of Europe.
"I am confident my Conduct hitherto, in suppressing the
Rebellion, and punishing those concern'd in it, has been
such, as demonstrates that I desire rather to lessen their
Numbers by reclaiming them, than by making Examples;
but I am sorry to find that the numerous Instances of Mercy
which I have shewn, have had no other Effect, than to encourage the Faction of the Pretender, to renew their Insults upon my Authority, and the Laws of the Kingdom,
and even to affect, with the greatest Insolence, to distinguish themselves from my good and faithful Subjects, acting
with such Folly and Madness, as if they intended to convince the World, that they are not to be reduc'd to Quiet
and Submission to my Government, by such gentle Methods
as are most agreeable to my own Inclinations.
Gentlemen of the House of Commons,
"I return you, in particular, my Thanks for the Supplies
you have given; which, although they fall short of the
Sums you found necessary, and have voted, for the Service of the whole Year; yet, by the Encouragement you
have given to make them effectual, may, I hope, be so
manag'd as to carry on the current Service 'till another
Session of Parliament.
My Lords and Gentlemen,
"I am very sensible there are Matters of great Consequence still depending before you; but as they have hitherto been postpon'd, out of absolute Necessity, by intervening Affairs of a more pressing Nature and of the most
immediate Concern to the Peace and Safety of the Nation,
I thought the Season of the Year requir'd I should defer
your farther Proceedings 'till the next Session, rather
than you should be detain'd out of your respective Countries longer than could be consistent with your private
Concerns.
"I cannot doubt but that, during this Recess, you will
all use your best Endeavours to preserve the Peace of the
Kingdom, and to discourage and suppress all Manner of
Disorders, since, as the first Scene of the late Rebellion
was open'd and usher'd in by Tumults and Riots, so you
may be assur'd, upon what Pretence soever they are rais'd,
they can have no other Tendency, but to support the Spirit of a Faction, restless and unweary'd in their Endeavours to renew the Rebellion, and to subvert the Religion,
Laws, and Liberties of their Country.
"I design to make Use of the approaching Recess, to visit
my Dominions in Germany, and to provide for the Peace
and Security of the Kingdom, during my Absence, by
constituting my beloved Son, the Prince of Wales, Guardian of the Realm, and my Lieutenant within the same.
The Parliament prorogued.
Then the Lord Chancellor, by his Majesty's Command,
prorogued the Parliament to the 7th Day of August; after
which they were farther prorogued to the 20th of February, 1716-17.