21 Aug.
Paris Archives,
K. 1568.
Portuguese. |
400. Advices from London (Antonio de Vega).
On the 15th I reported fully by special messenger to the
duke of Parma. I was on the point of going myself to give him
an account of what had happened with the Armada, in order that
he might endeavour to communicate with it, if he had not already
done so, and animate them (the Spaniards) or give them the
necessary information about winds, and orders as to when they
were to return, etc., etc. And, if his Majesty's intentions for any
reason could not be carried out, that the Armada might put into
some port of Embden or Norway, and there be furnished with
what is stated to be lacking, and subsequently again undertake the
task for which it was sent, without danger of loss of the Armada
itself, which God forbid for the sake of Christianity! I wrote this
(to the duke of Parma) and gave the bearer a few lines of credence
for your Lordship (Mendoza). The bearer is the master of the
household to my friend the French ambassador, to whom I was
obliged to discover myself ; although not before he had discovered
his own feelings to me, in consequence of some slight cast upon him
here. He swore solemnly to do everything in his power to injure
the Queen. He has made me great offers, and I think it would
answer our purpose for him to go to France for a couple of months,
to point out to the King the advisability of striving with all his
strength to ruin this country, which is the cause of all his trouble,
and not to resist the aggrandisement of the king of Spain. He
assures me he will do wonders with his master, and if necessary,
will find means for the Pope to intervene. If necessary I myself
could go to Spain to lay the matter before the King directly. There
will be no difficulty in finding a person to report what happens
here.
I will now proceed to relate the arrival of our Armada in this
country, the events up to the present, and the opinion entertained
of it both by friends and foes. I will not try to adorn my statement
with fine words, but will state the facts without deception. (fn. 1)
Although my special messenger will have given a verbal report
of the events of the Armada up to the time he left, and your
Lordship will also probably have received information from other
quarters, I think well to repeat briefly the substance of all the news
up to the present. Our Armada first arrived in sight of this country
on the 29th ultimo, and Drake and the Admiral were informed
thereof the same day, they being in Plymouth in consequence of the
weather. On the 30th they took their ships out of harbour in tow
of their boats ; the wind still being against them. On Sunday, the
last day of the month, they attacked our Armada with 75 sail, keeping
up the combat with cannon from eight o'clock in the morning
until four o'clock in the afternoon, when the English retired, astonished
at the strength and size of our ships and artillery. The Channel then
being free, our Armada proceeded on its way, followed by the
English fleet already mentioned, the rest of the English ships, to the
number of 40, being under Hawkins in the direction of Ireland.
The Admiral at once sent word to the Queen, reporting that our
Armada was much more powerful than had been expected, and
begging her urgently to order all ships in the Thames to join Lord
Harry Seymour and Winter, who were between Dover and Calais,
to oppose the forces of the duke of Parma. Orders were also sent
to Hawkins to join the fleet ; the intention being that on the arrival
of our Armada at the Downs it should be attacked on both sides by
the reinforced fleets, and dispersed. Such diligence was shown in the
matter here (i.e., in London) that of the ships in the river, and
the flotilla with a few stores that had come from Hamburg, they
managed in five days to send out 30 ships, and orders were given to
arm the rest, great and small. They also wrote to Holland and
Zeeland that the enemy's Armada had arrived, and begging them to
come at once with all the ships they had ready, and to arm the rest.
They raised a great number of men, both horse and foot, to hold the
country opposite Dunkirk, and sent many more on board the ships ;
a large number of noblemen volunteered and embarked.
On the passage of our Armada up the Channel, the ship of Don
Pedro de Valdez ran foul of another, and one of the enemy's ships
thereupon fired at her, and brought down her mast. Drake's ship
then came up and Don Pedro surrendered, without fighting, or
having a single man hurt. The other ship caught fire, and many of
her men were lost, 200 being saved and captured by the enemy,
with 500 of Don Pedro's men. They distributed these men in
various places, and brought 40 here for examination, lodging them
in Bridewell. When the news reached London, bonfires were lit all
over the city, and the bells were rung. Don Pedro, Don Alonso de
Zayas, and Don Vasco de Silva, were placed by Drake in his own ship,
where he kept them until the 9th instant ; when they were sent
hither to be interrogated by the Council, and were afterwards
carried to the house of Richard Drake, 16 miles from here, where
they are well treated.
The two fleets kept up the combat for the next few days ; the
principal engagement having been on Saturday (?) when they thought
here that our men would be finished, and great prayers were offered
up to this end. Our ships were attacked with great fury by the
vessels from Flushing and the rest of the fleet, which was in the
Channel, the Admiral always following up behind with 115 ships.
But notwithstanding all this, our Armada still went on in spite of
them, the English losses being heavy. So heavy were they that the
next day a proclamation was made that no reference to the fleet
was to be made. This is a sign that it cost them dearly.
Our Armada anchored near Calais on Saturday the 6th instant at
4 o'clock in the afternoon, where they remained until midnight on
Sunday—32 hours. The enemy then prepared seven ships with
pitch, hemp, etc., chained them together, the design being for them
to be set on fire when they neared our fleet, in the hope of burning
the latter. God so willed it that the ships caught fire before they
were intended to do so, and our Armada, being warned in time, set sail,
slipping their anchors. At this time the galleass of Don Hugo
Moncada got her rudder foul with a cable and broke it. This made
her unmanageable, and she ran aground near Calais, followed by
some small (English) ships. Most of the men on the galleass fled,
the captain being killed by a musket shot, and only 35 men were
taken by the enemy. The Armada reached the Downs, but as the
wind was too much S. and S.W., and the enemy was pressing our
ships at the same time, they were obliged to run up the English
coast towards the north. On the afternoon of the same day they
had a great engagement with the Queen's ships, and news came
hither that the latter had sunk a galleass, from which only the
captain and five men had been saved. (fn. 2)
For this the Queen knighted Frobisher, Hawkins, and a man
named Fenner. It was also reported that two others of our ships
were in a sinking condition. The ship that was sunk, however, was
not a galleass, but a ship from which they captured men, although
they are now saying that it was a galleon, but not one of the
Portuguese.
The Admiral wrote to the Queen saying that he and all the rest
of the captains looked upon the Armada as lost, as it was surrounded
by sand banks, and was very short of water ; having thrown
overboard large numbers of horses and mules, in consequence of this,
and many of the men having died from sickness caused by bad and
insufficient food. The prisoners, and some Portuguese who deserted
at night and swam to the enemy's ships, say that the Armada would
be ruined in a very short time, or at least forced to retire if they
could. They (the English captains?) therefore hoped to be able
to burn them first for which purpose they requested certain things.
The Queen thereupon sent Richard Drake and Raleigh with all
speed to order the Admiral to attack the Armada in some way, or
to engage it, if he could not burn it. She sent him many ships with
fuel and tar, and two engineers to see whether they could not burn
the Armada, as they dared not attack it at close quarters. It was
agreed by all the captains that they should not attempt it, but
should follow the Armada at a distance, harassing it with the wind
and want of provisions. News then reached here, that two of our
ships had been destroyed at Flushing, the Zeelanders having met
them and taken them, hanging all the men they took alive. Our
men therefore resisted desperately, and killed over 400 of the enemy
before they were overpowered. The enemy confesses to have lost
300 in this fight.
Reports also came from Plymouth that another great ship had
been captured, in consequence of its having broken its mast and
been left behind ; and so every day false news came in this way.
I considered it necessary under the circumstances, to inform the
Duke of this with all speed through your Lordship (Mendoza), the
only reason for my not having done so before being that the ports
were closed.
Yesterday the Admiral arrived at Margate with 30 ships, leaving
the rest at Norwich (Harwich) with Drake. They report that our
Armada left them on the 12th instant, sailing towards Norway,
they (the English) thereupon returning, as they were short of
provisions and munitions of war. They claim to have sunk three
ships, in addition to those that had been lost, that is to say seven in
all, although they say 12 or more, and that our Armada is destroyed.
But it is untrue, which is the principal thing. They also announce
that over 6,000 of our men have been lost or captured, whilst their
loss does not exceed 300. It is really over 1,500, and it is secretly
stated that they have lost 12 ships, although they deny it. They
are still preparing energetically, and will have a large number of
ships, 240 sail in all, great and small, including the Flushing
contingent, They are also arming furiously in Holland.
The Queen went to Gravesend to see the review of the troops that
was held there. On the Essex side there are 7,000 foot, and in Kent
12,000, although they assert that there are more than 40,000.
The cavalry was not collected ; but there are a great number
more troops all over the country, well armed but inexperienced.
From London only 1,000 men out of the 10,000 raised by the city
were sent.
Please inform the Duke about the Armada, and also send the
report to Spain as soon as possible. If the affair is to be prolonged
a reinforcement of the Armada will be necessary, and will always
be welcome. These people have received news that 60 ships are
coming with provisions and munitions. If this be so and they (the
men on the Armada?) could be advised of some place in France,
away from the Channel, where they could await them, it would be
well.—London, 21st August 1588. |
402. Diary of the Expedition to England, sent by the Duke Of
Medina Sidonia to the King with the preceding letter.
On the 22nd July 1588 the Duke and the whole of the Armada
sailed from Corunna with a SW wind which continued for the next
few days, the voyage being prosperous.
On the 25th the Duke sent Captain Don Rodrigo Tello to
Dunkirk to advise the duke of Parma of his coming, and to bring
back intelligence of Parma's condition, and instructions with regard
to the place where a junction of the forces should be effected.
On the 26th the weather was dead calm and overcast, which
lasted until mid-day. The wind then went round to the N. and the
Armada sailed in an easterly direction until midnight, when the
wind shifted to WNW., with heavy rain-squalls. The leading galley
"Diana" was missed during this day. She was making so much
water that the captain decided to run for a port.
On the 27th the same wind blew, but fresher, with very heavy
sea. This lasted until midnight, and the storm caused a large
number of ships and the other three galleys to separate from the
Armada.
On Thursday, the 28th, the day broke clear and sunny, the wind
and sea being more moderate. At dawn there were 40 ships and
the three galleys missing, whereupon the Duke ordered the lead to
be cast and bottom was found at 75 fathoms, 75 leagues from the
Scillys. The Duke then dispatched three pataches ; one to the
Lizard to see if the missing ships were there, and order them to
await the Armada ; another to reconnoitre the land ; and a third to
return on the course by which we had come to order the ships
to make more sail, and bring up stragglers.
On Friday, the 29th, the Armada continued sailing with a westerly
wind. The patache that went to the Lizard brought back news
that our missing ships were ahead, under Don Pedro de Valdés, who
had collected them and was awaiting the Armada. During the
afternoon all the ships, except Juan Martinez's (de Recalde's) flagship,
with Maestre de Campo Nicolas de Isla on board, and the three
galleys joined the Armada. The English coast was first sighted on
this day. It was said to be Cape Lizard.
On the 30th, at dawn, the Armada was very near the shore. We
were seen by the people on land, who made signal fires, and in the
afternoon the Duke sent Ensign Juan Gil in a rowing boat to obtain
intelligence. In the afternoon of the same day a number of ships
were sighted, but as the weather was thick and rainy they could not
be counted. Ensign Gil returned at night with four Englishmen in
a boat, hailing, as they said, from Falmouth. They reported that
they had seen the English fleet leave Plymouth that afternoon under
the Lord Admiral of England and Drake.
On Sunday, the 31st, the day broke with the wind changed to the
WNW. in Plymouth Roads, and 80 ships were sighted to windward
of us ; and towards the coast to leeward 11 other ships were
seen, including three large galleons which were cannonading some
of our vessels. They gradually got to windward and joined their
own fleet.
Our Armada placed itself in fighting order, the flagship hoisting
the royal standard at the foremast. The enemy's fleet passed,
cannonading our vanguard, which was under Don Alonso de Leyva,
and then fell on to the rearguard commanded by Admiral Juan
Martinez de Recalde. (fn. 4) The latter, in order to keep his place and
repel the attack, although he saw his rearguard was leaving him
unsupported and joining the rest of the Armada, determined to
await and fight. The enemy attacked him so fiercely with cannon
(but without coming to close quarters) that they crippled his rigging,
breaking his stay, and striking his foremast twice with cannon balls.
He was supported by the "Gran Grin," a ship of the rearguard, and
others. The royal flagship then struck her foresail, slackened her
sheets, and lay to until he (Recalde) joined the main squadron, when
the enemy sheered off, and the Duke collected his fleer. This was
all he was able to do, as the enemy had gained the wind, the English
ships being very swift and well handled, so that they could do
as they liked with them. On the same afternoon Don Pedro de
Valdéz's flagship fouled the "Catalina," one of the vessels of his
squadron, the bowsprit and foresail of the flagship being broken.
Don Pedro then joined the centre squadron of the Armada to repair
the damage. Our Armada continued to manœuvre until four o'clock
in the afternoon, trying to gain the wind of the enemy. At this
hour Oquendo's vice-flagship caught fire in the powder magazine,
two of his decks and the poop castle being blown up. In this ship
was the Paymaster-general of the Armada, with a part of his
Majesty's treasure. When the Duke saw that the vessel was falling
astern, he put about and went to her assistance, and gave a gun
signal for the rest of the fleet to do likewise. He then ordered the
pataches to go to the aid of Oquendo's ship. The fire was extinguished
and the enemy, who was making for Oquendo's ship, put about when
he saw the Duke's flagship standing by her. The ship was therefore
recovered and was again incorporated with the Armada. During
this manœuvre the foremast of Don Pedro de Valdéz's ship gave way
at the hatches and fell on the mainsail boom. The Duke again put
about to help him by sending him a hawser, but although great
efforts were made, the wind and weather did not admit of this being
done. Don Pedro's ship, therefore, began to be left astern, and, as it
was now night, Diego Flores told the Duke that if he took in sail
and stood by her the rest of the Armada would not perceive it, as
most of the ships were far in advance, and he would find himself in
the morning with less than half of the Armada. As we were so
near the enemy's fleet he (Diego Flores) was of opinion that the
Duke ought not to risk the whole of his force, as he was sure that
if he stood by he would lose the day. In the face of this advice the
Duke ordered Captain Ojeda to stand by Don Pedro's flagship, (fn. 5) with
four pataches, Don Pedro's vice-flagship, (fn. 6) Diego Flores' flagship, (fn. 7)
and a galleass, to attempt to pass a hawser on board Don Pedro's
ship and tow her, or else to take the men out of her. Neither of
these things, however, was possible, in consequence of the heavy
weather and rough sea, and its being night-time, and the Duke
therefore proceeded on his voyage and joined his fleet, his intention
being to keep the Armada well together, in view of what might
happen next day. An attempt was made this night to tranship the
burnt and wounded from Oquendo's vice-flagship. (fn. 8) During the
night the wind and sea rose considerably.
Monday, the 1st August, the Duke ordered Don Alonso de Leyva
to take the vanguard and join it to the rearguard, to form one body
together with the three galleasses, and the galleons "San Mateo,"
"San Luis," "Florencia," and "Santiago" ; making that squadron now
consist of the 43 best ships of the Armada, to withstand the enemy
and prevent him from standing in the way of our junction with the
duke of Parma. The Duke, with the rest of the Armada, now
formed the vanguard, the whole fleet being divided into two
squadrons only. The rearguard was under the command of Don
Alonso de Leyva, pending the repair of Juan Martinez's (de
Recalde's) ship, the Duke in person commanding the vanguard.
The Duke summoned the whole of the majors (sargentos mayores),
and ordered each one to go in a patache, and take his instructions
round to every ship in the Armada, specifying in writing the position
which they should respectively occupy. Orders were also given to
them, in writing, to immediately hang any captain whose ship left her
place, and they took with them the Provost Marshals and hangmen
necessary for carrying out this order. Three majors were told off
for each of the two squadrons, whose duty it was to execute the
aforesaid order.
At eleven o'clock on this day the captain of Oquendo's vice-flagship
came and informed the Duke that the ship was foundering, and
had become unmanageable. Orders were then given to tranship his
Majesty's treasure, and the men on board, the ship afterwards to be
sunk. In the afternoon of this day the Duke sent Ensign Juan Gil
in a patache to inform the duke of Parma of his position.
Tuesday, the 2nd August, broke fine, the enemy's fleet being to leeward,
sailing towards the land, and making great efforts to gain the
wind of us. The Duke also tacked towards the land and tried to keep
the wind. He led, followed by the galleasses, the rest of the
Armada being somewhat more distant, and the enemy noticing that
the Duke's flagship was approaching the land, and that it was
impossible to get to windward of her that way, put about to
seaward and sailed on the opposite tack. Our ships, being to
windward of the enemy, then attacked him. Captain Bertondona
engaged the enemy's flagship gallantly, pressing him to come to
close quarters, and getting quite near him. The enemy's flagship
then turned tail and put her head seaward, and the following of our
ships also attacked him and endeavoured to close with him, namely :—
the "San Marcos," "San Luis," "San Mateo," "La Rata," "Oquendo,"
"San Felipe," "San Juan de Sicilia," with Don Diego Tellez Enriquez
on board (which ship had been near the enemy since morning), the
galleon "Florencia," the galleon "Santiago," "the galleon "San Juan,'
with Don Diego Enriquez, son of the Viceroy of Peru, on board, and
the Levant ship "Valencera," with the Maestre de Campo, Don Alonso
de Luzon, on board. The vanguard galleasses approached quite close
to the enemy, thanks to the current, and the Duke sent them orders
to make every effort to close—using both sail and oar. The Duke's
flagship also turned to attack. The galleasses caught up with some
boats of the enemy's rearguard, which were skirmishing with some
of our boats ; the latter having got quite close to the enemy for the
purpose of boarding. (fn. 9) But it was all useless, for when the enemy
saw that our intention was to come to close quarters with him, he
sheered off to seaward, his great advantage being in the swiftness of
his ships. Soon afterwards the enemy's ships returned, with the
wind and tide in their favour, and attacked Juan Martinez de Recalde
in the rearguard. Don Alonso de Leyva reinforced the latter, and
our flagship, which was then in the midst of the main squadron,
sailed to the support of those ships of the Armada which were mixed
up with the enemy's rearguard and separated from the mass of both
fleets. The Duke ordered Captain Marolin to go in a feluca and
try to guide the vessels which were near the Duke's flagship to the
support of Juan Martinez de Recalde. When this was effected the
enemy left Juan Martinez, and attacked the Duke's flagship, which
was isolated and on her way to the assistance of the said ships. When
our flagship saw that the flagship of the enemy was leading towards
her, she lowered her topsails, and the enemy's flagship passed her,
followed by the whole of his fleet, each ship firing at our flagship
as it passed. The guns on our flagship were served well and
rapidly, and by the time half of the enemy's fleet had passed her the
fire became more distant. The flagship was reinforced by Juan
Martinez de Recalde, Don Alonso de Leyva, the Marquis de Peñafiel,
in the "San Marcos," and Oquendo, although by the time they came
up the hottest fury was passed. The enemy then put about to
seaward. We watched the enemy's flagship retreating and she
appeared to have suffered some damage. The enemy's vessels that
were engaged with our vanguard were also withdrawn. One of the
most forward of our ships in this three hours' skirmish was the
galleon "Florencia."
Wednesday, the 3rd, Juan Martinez de Recalde again assumed
command of the rearguard, Don Alonso de Leyva remaining with
him, the 40 odd ships that formed the rearguard being divided
between them. At dawn the enemy was near our rear, the vice-flagship
receiving some cannon fire from him. Our galleasses fired
their stern guns, Juan Martinez's, Don Alonso de Leyva's, and the
rest of the ships of the rear squadron did likewise without leaving
their positions, and the enemy then retired without attempting
anything further ; our galleasses having disabled the rigging of
the enemy's flagship, and brought down his mainsail boom.
Thursday, the 4th, St. Dominic's day, the hulk "St. Ana" and a
galleon of Portugal had fallen somewhat astern, and were fiercely
attacked by the enemy. The galleasses, Don Alonso de Leyva's and
other ships came to their assistance. Although the two ships were
surrounded by many enemies the galleasses were successful in
bringing them out. Whilst the skirmish was going on in the rear,
the enemy's flagship, with other large vessels, fell upon our royal
flagship which was leading the vanguard. They came closer than
on the previous day, firing off their heaviest guns from the lowest
deck, cutting the trice of our mainmast, and killing some of our
soldiers. The "San Luis," with the Maestre de Campo Don Agustin
(Mexia) on board, came to the rescue, and the enemy was also faced
by Juan Martinez de Recalde, the "San Juan" of Diego Flores'
squadron, with Don Diego Enriquez on board, and Oquendo, who
placed himself before our flagship, as the current made it impossible
for him to stand alongside. Other vessels did likewise, although
the enemy retired. The enemy's flagship had suffered considerable
damage, and had drifted somewhat to leeward of our Armada.
Our flagship then turned upon her, supported by Juan Martinez de
Recalde, the "San Juan de Sicilia," the flagship of the galleons of
Castile, the "Gran Grin" and the rest of our ships. To windward
of us was the enemy's fleet coming up to support their flagship,
which was in such straits that she had to be towed out by 11
long boats, lowering her standard and firing guns for aid. Our
royal flagship and vice-flagship in the meanwhile were approaching
so close to her that the rest of the enemy's vessels gave signs of
coming in to her assistance, and we made sure that at last we
should be able to close with them, which was our only way of
gaining the victory. At this moment the wind freshened in
favour of the enemy's flagship, and we saw she was getting away
from us, and had no further need of the shallops that were towing
her out. The enemy was then able to get to windward of us
again. As the Duke saw that further attack was useless, and
that we were already off the Wight, he fired a signal gun and
proceeded on the voyage, followed by the rest of the Armada in
good order ; the enemy remaining a long way astern. On this
day the Duke sent Captain Pedro de Leon to Dunkirk to advise
the duke of Parma as to his whereabouts, and inform him of events,
pressing him to come out with all possible speed and join the
Armada. Don Diego Enriquez, son of the Viceroy (of Peru), was
placed in command of Don Pedro de Valdéz's squadron, as he had
shown great care, in the science of seamanship.
Friday, the 5th, broke calm, both fleets being within sight of each
other, and the Duke sent another feluca to the duke of Parma with
the pilot Domingo Ochoa on board, to beg him to send us some cannon
balls of 4, 6, and 10 lbs. as a great many had been spent in the
skirmishing of the last few days. He was also instructed to request
Parma to send out 40 flyboats immediately to join the Armada ;
and so by their aid to enable us to come to close quarters with
the enemy, which we had hitherto found it quite impossible to do,
in consequence of our vessels being very heavy in comparison with
the lightness of the enemy's ships. Ochoa was also instructed to
press upon the duke of Parma the necessity of his being ready to
come out and join the Armada the very day it appeared in sight
of Dunkirk. The Duke (of Medina Sidonia) was very anxious on
this point, as be feared Parma was not at Dunkirk ; Don Rodrigo
Tello not having returned, and no messenger having come from
Parma. At sunset a breeze sprang up and the Armada again
got under way on the voyage towards Calais.
At daybreak on Saturday, 6th, the two fleets were close together,
and sailed on without exchanging shots until ten o'clock in the day,
our Armada having the wind astern and the rearguard well up, in
good order. At this hour the coast of France was sighted near
Boulogne and we proceeded on our voyage to Calais Roads, where
we arrived at four o'clock in the afternoon. There was some
difference of opinion as to whether we should anchor here, the
majority being in favour of sailing on. The Duke, however, was
informed by his pilots that if he proceeded any further the currents
would force him to run out of the Channel into Norwegian waters,
and he consequently decided to anchor off Calais, seven leagues
from Dunkirk, where Parma might join him. At five o'clock the
order to drop anchor was given to the whole Armada, and
Captain Heredia was sent to visit the governor of Calais, M. de
Gourdan, to explain the reason why we had anchored there and
offer him friendship.
This afternoon the enemy's fleet was reinforced by 36 sail,
including five great galleons. This was understood to be
John Hawkins' (fn. 10) squadron, which had been watching Dunkirk, and
the whole of the English fleet now anchored a league distant from
our Armada. Captain Heredia returned that night from Calais,
bringing friendly assurances and promises of service from the
Governor. The Duke dispatched Secretary Arceo to Parma, to
inform him of the position of the Armada, and to say that it was
impossible for it to remain where it was without very great risk.
On Sunday, the 7th, at daybreak, Captain Don Rodrigo Tello
arrived from Dunkirk (he having been sent thither by the Duke on
the 29th ultimo) and reported that the duke of Parma was at
Bruges, where he had visited him, and although he had expressed
great joy at the arrival of the Armada, he had not come to Dunkirk
up to the night of Saturday, the 6th, when Tello had left there, nor
had the embarcation of the men and stores been commenced.
On Sunday morning the governor of Calais sent his nephew to
visit the Duke (of Medina Sidonia), bringing with him a great
present of fresh provisions. He informed the Duke that the place
where he was lying was extremely dangerous to stay in, in
consequence of the cross currents of the Channel being very strong.
In view of the friendly attitude of the Governor, the Duke sent the
Provedore Bernabé de Pedroso, with the paymaster, to purchase
victuals. He also sent at night Don Jorge Manrique to Parma, to
urge upon him to expedite his coming out.
On Sunday night Secretary Arceo sent word to the Duke (of
Medina Sidonia) from Dunkirk that Parma had not yet arrived
there, the stores still being unshipped, and that he (Arceo) thought
that everything could not be ready under a fortnight.
At sunset on Sunday the enemy was joined by nine vessels, and
at the same time a squadron of about 26 ships came closer in shore
This raised a suspicion that their intention might be to set fire to us,
and the Duke ordered Captain Serrano to go in a pinnace, carrying
an anchor and cable, and in case they set adrift a fire ship to divert
it towards the land. At the same time orders were sent to all the
ships of the Armada to be on the alert, with rowing boats ready with
soldiers, to perform a similar service if necessary.
At midnight two fires were perceived on the English fleet, and
these two gradually increased to eight. (fn. 11) They were eight vessels
with sails set, which were drifting with the current directly towards
our flagship and the rest of the Armada, all of them burning
with great fury. When the Duke saw them approaching, and that
our men had not diverted them, he, fearing that they might
contain fire machines or mines, ordered the flagship to let go the
cables, the rest of the Armada receiving similar orders, with an
intimation that when the fires had passed they were to return to
the same positions again. The leading galleass in trying to avoid
a ship ran foul of the "San Juan de Sicilia," and became so crippled
that she was obliged to drift ashore. The current was so strong that
although the flagship, and some of the vessels near her, came to
anchor again and fired off a signal gun, the other ships of the
Armada did not perceive it, and were carried by the current towards
Dunkirk.
At dawn on Monday, the 8th, the Duke seeing that his Armada was
far ahead, and that the enemy was bearing down upon us with all
sail, weighed his anchor to go and collect the Armada, and endeavour
to bring it back to its previous position. The wind freshened from
the N.W., which is on to the shore, and the English fleet of 136 sail,
with the wind and tide in its favour, was overhauling us with great
speed, whereupon the Duke recognised that if he continued to bear
room and tried to come up with the Armada all would be lost, as his
Flemish pilots told him he was already very near the Dunkirk
shoals. In order to save his ships he accordingly determined to
face the whole of the enemy's fleet, sending pataches to advise the
rest of the Armada to luff close, as they were running on to the
Dunkirk shoals. The enemy's flagship, supported by most of his
fleet, attacked our flagship with great fury at daybreak, approaching
within musket-shot and sometimes within harquebuss-shot. The
attack lasted until three in the afternoon, without a moment's
cessation of the artillery fire, nor did our flagship stand away until
she had extricated the Armada from the sandbanks. The galleon
"San Marcos," with the marquis de Peñafiel on board, stood by the
flagship the whole time. The leading galleass, being unable to
follow the Armada, ran aground at the mouth of Calais harbour,
followed by some of the enemy's vessels. It is believed that she
was succoured by the guns of the fortress of Calais, and that the
men on board of her were saved. Don Alonso de Leyva, Juan
Martinez de Recalde, Oquendo's flagship, the whole of the ships of
the Castilian and Portuguese Maestres de Campo, Diego Flores'
flagship, Bertondona's flagship, the galleon "San Juan" of Diego
Flores, with Don Diego Enriquez on board, and the "San Juan de
Sicilia" with Don Diego Tellez Enriquez on board, withstood the
enemy's attack as well as they could, and all of these ships were so
much damaged as to be almost unable to offer further resistance,
most of them not having a round of shot more to fire. Don
Francisco de Toledo, who brought up the rear, attempted to close
with the enemy. The latter turned upon him with so hot an
artillery fire that he was in difficulty. Don Diego de Pimentel
then came to his support, but they were both of them being overpowered,
when Juan Martinez de Recalde, with Don Augustin
Mexia, bore up and extricated them. But, notwithstanding this,
these two ships (i.e., those of Toledo and Pimentel) once more got
in the midst of the enemy, together with Don Alonso de Luzon's
ship, the "Santa Maria de Begoña," with Garibay on board, and the
"San Juan de Sicilia," with Don Diego Tellez Enriquez on board.
They very nearly closed with the enemy without grappling, the
English keeping up an artillery fire, from which our men defended
themselves with musketry and harquebuss fire, as they were so near.
The Duke heard the sound of small arms, but was unable to distinguish
what was going on from the maintop, in consequence of
the smoke ; but he saw that two of our ships were amongst the
enemy, and that the latter, leaving our flagship, concentrated all his
fleet in that direction, so the Duke ordered the flagship to put
about to assist them. The Duke's ship was so much damaged with
cannon-shot between wind and water that the inflow could not be
stopped, and her rigging was almost cut to shreds, but nevertheless,
when the enemy saw that she was approaching, his ships left the
vessels they were attacking, namely, those of Don Alonso de
Luzon, Garibay, Don Francisco de Toledo, Don Diego Pimentel,
and Don Diego Tellez Enriquez. The three latter were most
exposed, and were completely crippled and unserviceable, nearly
all the men on board being either killed or wounded, although that
of Don Diego Tellez Enriquez made shift to follow us in very bad
case. The Duke then collected his force, and the enemy did likewise.
The Duke ordered pataches to be sent and take off the men from the
"San Felipe," and the "San Mateo." The pataches succeeded in
taking the men out of the "San Mateo," but Don Diego Pimentel
refused to abandon the ship, sending Don Rodrigo Vivero and Don
Luis Vanegas to the Duke to ask him to send someone on board to
inspect the vessel, and ascertain whether she was seaworthy. The
Duke sent a pilot and a diver from this galleon (i.e., the "San
Martin"), although we were in great risk without him (the pilot?).
As the night was falling and the sea was very heavy they were
unable to reach the "San Mateo," but they saw it that night at a
distance, falling off towards Zeeland. The galleon "San Felipe"
went alongside the hulk "Doncella," and transhipped on board of
the latter all the company. But when Don Francisco (de Toledo)
had gone on board the hulk a cry was raised that she was foundering,
and Captain Juan Poza de Santiso leapt on to the "San
Felipe" again, followed by Don Francisco. This was a great
misfortune, for it was not true that the hulk was sinking, and
the "San Felipe" also went towards Zeeland with Don
Francisco on board, after the Duke had been informed that he
and all his men were safe on the hulk. The sea was so heavy
that nothing else could be done, and it was even impossible to
patch up the injuries to the flagship ; whereby she was in great danger
of being lost. The Duke wished during this day to turn and
attack the enemy with the whole Armada, in order to avoid
running out of the Channel, but the pilots told him it was
impossible, as both wind and tide were against us ; the wind blowing
from the N.W. towards the land. They said that he would be forced
either to run up into the North Sea, or wreck all the Armada on the
shoals. He was therefore utterly unable to avoid going out of the
Channel, nearly all of our trustworthy ships being so damaged as to
be unfit to resist attack, both on account of the cannon fire to which
they had been exposed, and their own lack of projectiles.
Tuesday, the 9th, eve of St. Lorenzo. At two o'clock in the
morning the wind blew so strongly that, although our flagship was
brought up as close to the wind as possible, she began to fall off to
leeward towards the Zeeland coast, the Duke's intention having been
to stay so that he might again enter the Channel. At daybreak the
N.W. wind fell somewhat, and we discovered the enemy's fleet of
109 ships rather over half a league astern of us. Our flagship
remained in the rear with Juan Martinez de Reoalde, Don Alonso de
Leyva, the galleasses, and the galleon "San Marcos" and "San Juan"
of Diego Flores, the rest of our Armada being distant and a great
deal to leeward. The enemy's ships bore down on our flagship,
which came round to the wind and lay to ; the galleasses placed
themselves in front, and the rest of our rearguard stood by ready to
repel attack, whereupon the enemy retired. The Duke then fired
two guns to collect the Armada and sent a pilot in a patache to order
the ships to keep their heads close to the wind, as they were almost
on the Zeeland shoals. This prevented the enemy from approaching
closer to us, as they saw that our Armada was going to be lost ;
indeed the experienced pilots who accompanied the Duke assured
him at this time that it was impossible to save a single ship of the
Armada, as they must inevitably be driven by the north-west wind
on to the banks of Zeeland. God alone could rescue them. From
this desperate peril, in only six and a half fathoms of water, we were
saved by the wind shifting by God's mercy to the S.W., and the
Armada was then able to steer a northerly course without danger
to any of our ships. The orders sent by the Duke in the pataches
were that the whole of the ships were to follow in the wake of the
flagship, as otherwise they would run upon the banks. The same
afternoon the Duke summoned the generals and Don Alonso de
Leyva to decide what should be done. The Duke submitted the
state of the Armada, and the lack of projectiles, a fresh supply of
which had been requested by all the principal ships ; and asked the
opinion of those present as to whether it would be best to return to
the English Channel, or sail home to Spain by the North Sea, the duke
of Parma not having sent advice that he would be able to come out
promptly. The council unanimously resolved in favour of returning
to the Channel if the weather would allow of it, but if not, then
that they should obey the wind and sail to Spain by the North Sea,
bearing in mind that the Armada was lacking all things necessary,
and that the ships that had hitherto resisted were badly crippled.
The wind from the S. S. W. kept increasing in violence, and the Duke
continued to get further out to sea, followed by the whole of the
enemy's fleet. With regard to the fighting on the flagship, taking
up of position, &c., the Duke followed the advice of the Maestre de
Campo, Don Francisco de Bobadilla, who had many years' experience
of fighting on land and sea. He had been ordered by the Duke at
Corunna to leave the galleon "San Marcos" and go on board the
flagship, and had left on the "San Marcos" the marquis de
Peñafiel, who declined to go to the flagship in consequence of the
gentlemen who were with him on the former galleon. In the
management of the Armada, and in maritime matters, the Duke was
guided by General Diego Flores, who had also been ordered to go on
board the flagship, he being one of the oldest and most experienced
of seamen.
On Wednesday, the 10th, the Armada was under way with a
fresh S. W. wind and a heavy sea, the enemy's fleet following us. In
the afternoon the violence of the wind abated, and the enemy came
under full sail towards our rearguard. The Duke, seeing this, and
that the rearguard under Juan Martinez de Recalde was weak in
ships, struck his topsails and awaited the rearguard ; at the same
time fired the signal of three guns at intervals, to order the rest of
the Armada, which, was under full sail, to shorten sail and stand by
for the rearguard and the flagship. What was done in these
circumstances by our Armada will be related by Don Baltasar de
Zuñiga. (fn. 12) When the enemy saw that our flagship, the galleasses,
and 12 of our best ships were standing by, he shortened sail and
dropped astern without firing at us. John Hawkins with his
squadron turned back during the night.
On Thursday, 11th, we kept under way with the same fresh
wind, the enemy's fleet having now fallen far astern ; but in the
afternoon he clapped on all sail and bore down upon us, We were
then able to count his ships, and noticed that Hawkins' squadron
had gone. The galleasses again brought to, and our flagship came
round and waited, when the enemy once more retired without
coming within gunshot.
On Friday, the 12th, at dawn, the enemy's fleet was quite close to
us, but as they saw we were well together, and that the rearguard
had been reinforced, the enemy fell astern and sailed towards
England until we lost sight of him. Since then we have continued
sailing with the same wind until we left the Norwegian Channel,
and it has been impossible for us to return to the English Channel
even if we desired to do so. We have now, the 20th August,
doubled the last of the Scottish Islands to the north, and we have
set our course with a N.E. wind for Spain. |