March 1547, 16-31


Institute of Historical Research



Martin A. S. Hume and Royall Tyler (editors)

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'Spain: March 1547, 16-31', Calendar of State Papers, Spain, Volume 9: 1547-1549 (1912), pp. 53-64. URL: Date accessed: 20 April 2014. Add to my bookshelf


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March 1547, 16–31

17 March. Simancas E. 644.The Emperor to Diego de Mendoza.
Since we wrote the very long letter to you, giving an account of our interviews with the Nuncio, the latter again sought audience, having received fresh letters from Rome. He began his discourse by saying that he had been unable to avoid informing his Holiness of what was being asserted here, to the effect that what had happened in Genoa (fn. 1) was with his connivance. His Holiness was astonished that such a thing should be said or even thought of him. One of two things, he said, must be true: either we believed these rumours or not. If we did believe them he prayed us to examine and enquire into the matter, and when we knew the truth we should acknowledge that what was said was untrue. We could not think in such case that he would be a party to such a scandalous proceeding, being, as he is, an honest man. If we did not believe the rumours we might judge from them of the malignity of the people who wished to raise discord between persons so sincerely united in friendship as his Holiness and ourselves, the results of which union had been such good works as the enterprise in Germany and the success of the Council (of Trent).
We replied that we neither believed the rumours nor disbelieved them, so that such a hard and fast line as he indicated could not be drawn. On the one hand the statements seemed so utterly at variance with the dignity and duty of his Holiness, whereas on the other so many suspicious circumstances existed, such as the cipher which the man let drop in Rome, at a time when it might be presumed some such plan as that referred to would be discussed. With difficulty an explanation might possibly be found, but God would in due time reveal the truth and we were content to wait. The Nuncio pressed us much to give the Pope the consolation of saying we did not believe such a thing of him, but we replied that he might judge by what we had already said, that if we made such a declaration it would not be true, since we had told him that we neither believed nor disbelieved it. He retorted that we should assuredly find that his Holiness had no share whatever in the business: the statements had been made by people who wished to impede the success of the good works already mentioned, as having resulted from the friendship. He would instance such good works as the enterprise in Germany and the progress of the Council, In the article, he said, on the reformation of the church now under discussion it is proposed that the bishops and cardinals who hold two sees should be obliged to surrender one, those in the gift of his Holiness to be surrendered within six months, and those in the gift of sovereigns within one year, whilst the cardinals not in residence in their churches should be in future near his Holiness at Rome. We did not think fit to say much about this, merely replying that the reform of abuses was always desirable.
The Nuncio then changed the subject, saying that the Pope, having learnt of the death of the King of England, it had appeared to his Holiness that the present time offered a favourable opportunity for the submission of that country once more to our holy Catholic faith. In order that so auspicious an opportunity should not be lost, he had decided to appeal to all Christian princes for aid, and was intending to appoint Legates for that purpose, one to go to us, another to the King of France, and another to the King of England, and he exhorted us warmly not to miss such an opportunity. We replied that we were not fully informed as to the present condition of English affairs since the King's death. All that we heard was that the bishops had been excluded from the Privy Council, even those who were strongly of the King's opinion. We had sent M. de Chantonnay to visit the new King, and when he returned perhaps we might have more information of what was happening there, in which case we should be able to take the most advantageous course.
The Nuncio's third and last point, was that the Pope had not been able to decide before with regard to the mission of Don Francisco de Toledo, as the matter was new to him, and he was not very well informed about it. He feared that it would be an ominous precedent for France, besides which the clergy in Spain were already so burdened, and if this proposal about the plate and the fabrics of the churches was accepted the amount would reach at least three millions in addition to the burden already imposed upon them in lieu of the sale of the monastic manors. To this and similar arguments we replied that we had no doubt that the Pope really believed that three millions could be raised by the means proposed, and we hoped to God that he was right, for the sum would come in very useful for the enterprise in which we were engaged, than which certainly no better way of spending it could be found.
We did not fail to deal also with the importance of the matter to France. In any case the same course had often been adopted in that country; the bishops themelves having power to act in that sense, for so necessary and saintly an object. With reference to his remark that the 400,000 crowns in addition was to be drawn from the same source, we could assure him that such was not our intention; but that those who had contributed to the latter amount should be allowed to deduct the sums paid towards the half of their possessions. Our own suspicion was, however, that there would be found so little over that we had often thought of abandoning the proposal altogether. The Nuncio replied that the Pope in fact had always done, and still would do, his utmost; to which we said that how much that was might easily be seen in the past and present. With regard to the future we saw no signs of improvement. The conversation then ended.
On the 11th the Nuncio again saw us, and said that he had received advice that his Holiness had chosen the two Legates, the choice of the Legate for England being reserved in pectore. He trusted in God that the submission of England might gain for us as much honour as the campaign in Germany to a similar saintly end, and hoped we should not neglect the opportunity offered. We interrupted the Nuncio by asking whether his Holiness thought that the English question was to be solved by force of arms. He replied that he did not know the Pope's mind on that point, but he thought that his Holiness would be glad if it could be done without armed force if possible. We assured him that we should not fail to do our duty as a Christian prince in the English matter; but as to taking up arms, not only would we not do so against the King of England for the Pope, but we would not do so at his instance against the worst man alive. We understood his manœuvres too well now, for he had drawn us into this enterprise in Germany and left us in the lurch at the most critical point. We hoped, nevertheless, that God, who had allowed us to begin so well, would carry us to the end successfully. The Nuncio in answer to this could only repeat that his Holiness would do his utmost, and we again said that what he did was very evident notwithstanding all our persuasions.
The Nuncio then reverted to Don Francisco de Toledo's mission, saying that his Holiness had been unable to go farther than he had done in that matter until he saw how the question of the 300,000 crowns that had been conceded in lieu of the 500,000 for the monastic manors was to be settled. We do not know whether the Nuncio said this in error, or whether it was intended as an indication that the Pope was anxious to retract his promise of 400,000. He continued his speech without interruption, making much of the fact that Don Francisco (de Toledo) and Juan de Vega had added that even if the Pope refused to concede the request about the church plate and buildings we were determined to take it. We replied that it was quite true that we had written to them to that effect. The Nuncio replied that as the example would be most injurious and we being so true a Catholic prince he felt sure we would never do such a thing without the apostolic authority; to which we replied that our demand was just, and yet it had been flatly refused regardless of the urgent need for granting it. The Pope might be perfectly certain that if the sum reached was half of his estimate of three millions we should levy it without waiting for any further authority from Rome, as we were well able to do. The Catholic Kings (fn. 2) , who were much better Catholics than the Pope, who was no saint, had done so after full discussion in Council. That was for a war against Portugal: how much more licit was it for a war against heretics. He remarked that we must not think at all events that we could do it with a clear conscience, to which we replied that we could, and with a much better conscience than that of the Pope, who was hoarding up his money to benefit his family. Pope Clement VII., we said, although we did not all of us think he was a good man, did some good things, as the Pope well knew, and we should not cease to be good Christians even if we did as we said. We had paid every possible respect to the Pope in this matter, but in future we intended to respect Saint Peter and not Pope Paul, if things were to be carried in this way. We were astonished, we said, at the pretty excuse now forthcoming for doing nothing in the matter of Don Francisco's mission, to the effect that we had no further need for the money now that the war was over. The Nuncio said that this was not the Pope's meaning, but that the rest of the trouble would be easily appeased. Thank God, we said, things had gone well with us, however distasteful the fact might be to the Pope. But disabled as we were, with one arm lame from gout and the other arm blooded we hoped to go and put the finishing touch to the work. If the Pope gave us no further aid, and he (the Nuncio) came to the campaign we would clap him and the Pope's Legate into the front rank of fighters, so that they might set an example to the others, and see what their blessings would do. The Nuncio made no reply to this.
As he was leaving he said the Pope was desirous of pacifying the Petillano affair, but the son stood out obstinately in the hope of our favour, and he begged us not to irritate matters further. We replied that all we had done had been to promise the Count's son, who had served with the Pope's contingent, that we should not forget his services.
Throughout this interview we were purposely rough, in order to give the lie to the rumour in Rome that we were softening. Our remark that if the amount from the plate and buildings came to a half of the Pope's estimate, which would be a million and a half, we should take it without the Pope's consent, was necessary, because if we do not do it they may not think it is because they have withheld the consent, but because the sum mentioned has not been reached. We write you thus fully that you may proceed accordingly with his Holiness.
17 March, 1547.
March 18. Vienna Imp. Arch.Van der Delft to the Queen Dowager.
M. de Chantonnay, who has accomplished his mission here with great satisfaction to everyone, being now about to return to your Majesty after having made himself well acquainted with the progress of affairs here, he will give a full report thereupon to your Majesty, although matters are still too unsettled for a trustworthy judgment to be formed upon them. I will therefore only add to his intelligence that although these people (the English) protest that they have made no other arrangement with France except with the object of further ensuring the peace between them, I do not know how far they have been influenced by the conviction that they have always entertained, namely, that the Emperor had an understanding with the Pope. I have never, in spite of all my efforts, been able to banish this idea from the minds, either of the late King or of the present rulers, on account partly of their enmity towards his Holiness and partly of their attachment to the Protestants. I am therefore uncertain whether they may not under the influence of this idea have advanced further than they say in their negotiations with the French.
But we have ascertained, at all events, that they have not in any way contravened the treaties existing between them and his Majesty (the Emperor); and, according to what Paget expressly declared to us, if the French think of making war upon the Emperor it will not be in amity with them (the English). Paget affirmed that nothing had ever been done so much to his Majesty's advantage as this; and the Protector and Paget endeavoured to make me believe it with the most solemn assurances on their honour, saying that if it were not true they consented to be held as the most miserable men in the world, and that no fault would be found with them in this respect. The Protector had spoken to me in similar terms in private two days previously, in order, as he said, not to conceal from me the fact that they were about to negotiate with the French. But, to judge from the discourse that Paget has held with M. de Chantonnay and myself, it may be presumed that they have bound themselves closely and completely to the King of France so long as he does not attack any of the Emperor's dominions; whereas if his Majesty himself commences war against the King of France, these people (the English) will appeal to their treaties on one side or the other, befriending most the party that seems to prosper best. This point your Majesty will hear better set forth by M. de Chantonnay.
The English have captured three of the best of the Scottish ships of war and remain still well armed and provided at sea. It is reported also that the French still have their galleys near the English coasts so that they are at present masters of the Channel. The inconvenience which this will cause to the subjects and dominions of the Emperor, will be evident to your Majesties without any words of mine, but I may say that the complaints of the said subjects in this respect are increasing daily, whilst very scant justice is being done to them here, all their causes being suspended until the property of English subjects embargoed in Spain shall be released against security. Madam, after M. de Chantonnay had taken his leave of the King I thought better that he should remain here a few days longer, for the reasons which he himself will explain to your Majesty. You will consider whether for these same reasons it will be advisable to send someone here for a longer stay as I am suggesting in my letter to the Emperor.
London, 18 March, 1547.
March 18. Vienna Imp. Arch.Van der Delft to the Emperor.
M. de Chantonnay has accomplished his mission here to the great contentment of everyone, and is now returning to your Majesty, after having seen and made himself thoroughly acquainted with the condition of affairs here, which are not yet sufficiently settled in appearance for a trustworthy judgment to be formed upon them. M. de Chantonnay will report fully to your Majesty, and I have only to add that, although these people here (the English councillors) assert that they have had no other object in entering into fresh negotiations with France except to ensure peace, I am uncertain whether the impression which, they have always had that your Majesty had some agreement with the Pope (which impression I have never been able to overcome, either now or in the time of the late King, thanks to their enmity towards his Holiness and their leaning towards the Protestants) may not have moved them to carry further the negotiations with France. All we have been able to ascertain is that in no case will they have contravened the treaties they have with your Majesty. According to what Paget told us, they had emphatically declared that if the French had any intention of making war upon your Majesty the English would not be friendly with them, in which Paget affirmed they had done more for your Majesty's advantage than ever had been done before. Both Paget and the Protector endeavoured to impress this upon my belief by assurances upon their honour, saying that they were willing to be considered the vilest of men in the world if they were found lacking in this respect.
The Protector himself had separately discoursed with me to a similar effect two days previously, in order, as he said, not to make any secret that they were about to conclude an agreement with the French. But to judge from the expressions used by Paget to M. de Chantonnay and myself, it may be surmised that they have entered into a full binding agreement with the King of France, except in the case of his invading your Majesty's dominions. In the event of your Majesty's beginning war against the French, these people (the English) would appeal to their treaties either on the one side or the other, and would incline to that which seemed most prosperous, as your Majesty will be better informed by M. de Chantonnay.
The English have captured three of the best Scottish war ships, and are still well armed at sea, whilst it is said that the French retain their galleys as before on this coast (i.e., the Channel), so that they command the Straits. The inconvenience that your Majesty's dominions and subjects will suffer from this state of affairs will be quite evident to you. Complaints on the subject from them are increasing daily here, but no great satisfaction is given to them, the whole of the claims made by them being held in suspense until all the English property embargoed in Spain has been released on security. They say that I had better do all I can to get the embargoes raised, as I had informed them by your Majesty's orders that you were willing should be done, out of consideration for the late King, although Renegat had not restored that which he had unjustly seized, (fn. 3) and when it was effected they (the English) would do their duty on their part.
Since M. de Chantonnay took leave of the King I thought advisable that he should stay here a few days longer, for the reasons which he will state to your Majesty, and in view of these reasons your Majesty may consider whether it will not be advisable to send some envoy here for a longer stay.
London, 18 March, 1547, before Easter. (fn. 4)
March 20. Simancas E. 644.The Emperor to Prince Philip.
Your letters have all been received, the latest dated 25 January. It has been impossible for us to reply to them earlier in full, as we have, as you know, been travelling about, and much occupied. Even after we arrived at Ulm we found an immense amount of work to do, settling matters with these principal cities which have sent in their submission, and in other pressing business; so that, anxious as we were to send off this post earlier we could not do so. Nevertheless Eraso sent from Heilbronn by a Portuguese the substance of the capitulation of the Duke of Wurtemburg, and an account of the condition of affairs with regard to Augsburg which subsequently came to terms. Argentina (Strassburg) also gave signs of a desire to submit, and has sent representatives to negotiate, but nothing definite has yet been arranged, as the deputies wished to refer to the city again. There are hopes, however, that the city will submit, which will be of great importance, as in that case all the territory on this side of the Danube will be tranquillised, and the negotiations of France and the Swiss will therefore be unnecessary.
This letter will accordingly deal with the points in your letters still remaining open. First I may express my joy that you and my daughters and the Infanta are well. Thank God my own health is good, though of course the past and present anxiety and trouble make themselves felt. But as all that has been done has been in the service of God and His holy faith, we not only consider our travail well bestowed, but will continue to devote ourselves to the furtherance of the cause. We wish we could go with the troops we have retained under arms to aid our brother the King of the Romans and Duke Maurice, to settle affairs in Saxony, which are so important to all Germany, because, although they (i.e., King Ferdinand and Duke Maurice) have a larger number of infantry and cavalry than the enemy, a part of their men cannot be trusted to fight; but we have decided nevertheless to defer going thither for the present; though we are sending 1,000 cavalry of the Marquis Albert, eight standards of infantry, and also the Marquis John of Brandenburg with his cavalry, the Spanish infantry regiment of D. Alvaro de Sande and the brigade of the Marquis of Marignano. With these reinforcements and the troops they already have, together with the councillors sent to them, we are sure that they (i.e., King Ferdinand and Duke Maurice) will be able to finish matters there, so that they may not interfere with the other objects we have in view.
One of the principal of these things is to effect a league of some of the free towns and the principal cities of the empire, because without that, however much we might desire to obtain the aid of our States we could not keep on foot the army which in any case will be necessary until the whole question of Germany is finally settled. We have therefore determined to go to the city of Frankfort, where a sort of conference has been arranged to meet on the 20th of this month. I am leaving in Ulm and Augsburg two brigades of Germans two thousand strong each, which I think will be sufficient. When we arrive at Frankfort we shall get to business briskly; and in the meanwhile we shall give orders for the territories of the Landgrave in that neighbourhood to be entered and seized. We think that this can be done easily if we send the two Spanish regiments as well as the foot and mounted Germans who are to accompany us. We may also be able from there to help and encourage the struggle in Saxony, and with this object we have taken rather a roundabout way, leaving the straight road for a few days. We shall do the best we can in the circumstances as they arise, endeavouring in any case to effect the league of cities and undo the Duke of Saxony and the Landgrave, upon which the final conclusion of the business depends.
With regard to other subjects, you will see by the copies of letters enclosed what has passed between us and the Nuncio and the French Ambassador, with the reply given by the King of France, which is gentler in tone than at first seemed probable. Although we do not believe that any move will be made in that quarter at present, it will be wise to keep secretly a close watch upon the frontiers.
In the matter of finance we have considered very carefully all you have written to us, as well as the statement of the amounts due on account of bills of exchange and other things up to the end of 1546. We note also the estimate of the sum needed for ordinary expenditure, and the revenues already apportioned. The amount thus apportioned reaches nearly a million one hundred thousand ducats, without including the money needed for the Queen's (fn. 5) household, your own and my daughter's maintenance, and the salaries of the Councils and Court officials, as they are all included in the demands upon the general revenue, as also are the 300,000 ducats drawn in bills by Queen Marie (i.e., Queen Dowager of Hungary, Governess of the Netherlands), the cost of Don Bernardino de Mendoza's galleys and the defence of the African frontiers. We have also noted the state of the rest of the revenues and the suggestions made with regard to the raising of the funds needed. We are loth to resort to these measures, but seeing the urgency both in Spain and here, we have decided that the following course shall be adopted.
First: With regard to the half of the treasures of the churches and monasteries in Spain and the half of the value of the fabrics of the cathedrals, we note the persons you summoned to hear our letter read, and that the opinion was that the matter should be communicated to the Royal Council, since in any case they must have known of it before it could be carried into effect. We note also the result of the joint discussion of the matter; and though we readily believe that they are sorry, considering the love and loyalty they profess, to have to raise so many obstacles and difficulties to providing thus the funds we so urgently need, yet we cannot avoid saying that the mere raising of difficulties is always easy, and especially in matters of great importance such as this; and the Councillors should not have contented themselves with this, but should have advised us as to the means of carrying the plan into effect if necessary. Because, with affairs in their present condition, and the issues for good or evil being so important, it is of the utmost urgency that we should be helped from all quarters, especially by such expedients as that proposed. Our patrimony, as is known, is exhausted, and other sources of revenue failing to provide for the armies and fleets we have raised for the defence of Christianity and our own dominions, it has seemed to us that the means proposed would be the least oppressive to our subjects, whose burdens would not be increased, only that treasure being drawn upon which is at present deposited and perhaps unnecessary for divine service. To employ such resources for an end so saintly as ours and for the conversion of those who have gone astray seemed fitting. We ourselves have risked our person and dominions in the struggle with no other object than that we have set forth; and we recall that whilst we were in Spain there was no subject upon which we were so frequently pressed, as this question of the vindication of the faith; and yet now that we have undertaken it and, by God's blessing brought the issue to a point more favourable than was ever anticipated, it might have been expected that the first care would have been to devise means to carry out what was necessary instead of raising difficulties in this way. The King of France without any authority from the Pope is accustomed to avail himself of this source of supply for his own purposes, which everybody knows have no good object from beginning to end, whereas, as we have already pointed out, the purpose for which we intend to apply the money is saintly and just, and one which ecclesiastics, churches and monasteries with all their belongings are bound in duty to contribute. We are therefore of opinion that the means for carrying the plan into execution should be discussed and settled pending the granting of the bull for the purpose by the Pope. If the bull be not granted we have no intention of carrying the matter further; but in the contrary case it must be put into execution without delay, in order that our present great need may be relieved. We have not neglected to consider the matter here, and we think that the prelates and provincials of conventual orders should be spoken to confidentially, so that each one may enquire what silver, gold and jewels there may be under his authority and what portion thereof can be dispensed with, after leaving what is necessary for divine worship. By this means the amount will be ascertained without the risk of the clergy's hiding or transporting the treasure. The matter, indeed, might be approached gradually under any pretext that may be considered best, and the minds of the persons interested prepared for it, so that the plan might be executed without trouble or resistance when the time came. You see how important this is, and we bid you to have the matter considered and arranged as I desire.
Nordlingen, 20 March, 1547.
There is adjoined to the above letter another of the same date from the Emperor to Cobos to a similar effect. The Emperor congratulates Cobos upon his convalescence, and hopes that he will scon be able to return to work, his presence by the side of the Prince being so needful in financial affairs. The Emperor's need has been so pressing that he has been obliged to borrow 5,000 florins of the Betzares on a bill of exchange on the Spanish exchequer to be met from the first payments collected. He begs Cobos to meet this and other bills previously drawn in favour of the same bankers.
March 21. Paris K. 1487.St. Mauris to Granvelle.
Five or six days ago I sent you a letter by a student, informing you of the state of affairs here up to that time. The King of France was, as you will have learnt, very ill, and still continues so, greatly distressed by an intermittent fever, which like the rest of his malady originates from the apostheme that troubles him, and which is to a certain extent open. He is in grave peril in the opinion of the doctors. The Admiral of France and Madame d'Etampes are doing their utmost to cure him, whilst he is in great fear of death, since the coming of an Englishman to deliver letters from the King of England now dead. This gentleman gave the King of France a message from the late King on his death bed, to the effect that he (King Francis) ought to bear in mind that he, too, was mortal. This admonition amazed and distressed the King to such an extent that he fell ill from that moment.
You are aware of the answer given to me by the King respecting the stoppage of warlike preparations. Great show of doing this was made, orders being sent to Provence and Dauphine, as they had promised, for all preparations to be suspended. But since then they have returned to their vomit, and are making every possible effort to strengthen themselves. They announce that this is being done simply for the defence of the realm, and to prevent being surprised by the Emperor. They say that they have no intention of invading the territories of others, but as they are in the habit of doing the very contrary of what they say, it will be wise not to trust them overmuch. Their preparations are as follows. The King is busily collecting money both in Lyons and Paris, having imposed a tax of four tenths, which is to be levied on the produce of 1546. They say that the “billet” of the tax which was brought to him amounted to a very great sum, that of last year not having been employed, owing to the short duration of the war. They have these amounts therefore now in cash, and in addition they are levying a new tax of four tenths for the present year at the end of June. Besides this, the King had in hand the amount necessary for the 50,000 (?) infantry which the fortified towns are bound to provide in time of war. This will probably reach 600,000 crowns, and he wishes to raise 500,000 more from the rest of the country, outside Paris, which city provides him with 100,000 crowns. Cardinal de Meudon is in Paris to receive the money that is coming in, which they say here reaches a vast sum. As much effort to raise funds is being made as if the country was already at war. Captains have been commissioned to recruit light horse, and the old standards of light horse are being filled up, which is an innovation. They say that these light horse consist of 1,200, part of whom are to be sent to Piedmont.
Most of the Governors and commanders of the realm have recently been at Court for some days with them, secretly negotiating at Rambouillet, at the time that the King was very ill. It is said that orders were given for the frontiers to be well armed, and that troops should be got ready with all speed. The two overdue payments to the men have been paid, and troops are to be quickly enlisted, etc., etc. . . All the galleys are being put into commission, money for the purpose having recently been handed to the captains, so that they may be ready to put to sea by the end of April. Ten or twelve of their ships of war are also being fitted out at Dieppe and Havre de Grace, and they are talking about sending great garrisons to Burgundy and 400 men at arms to Bresse. I hear also that they are to send, or have sent 100,000 crowns to Switzerland, probably to pay the ordinary subsidies there. It is certain that they have a close understanding with those confederations, to which they will look for help if they need it, since it is clear that they can get Germans from them . . .
The King of France has just sent 60,000 crowns to Lubeck from Dieppe to aid the rebels and to arouse them against the Emperor . . . . All these preparations show the ill will these people bear to the Emperor. It is true that they say their only object is to defend their own country and to guard against surprise, since the Emperor's success in Germany makes them fear that he may turn his arms against them. The people are much rejoiced at this, and say that the King is wiser this time than before. In effect, the King and country are full of fear and distrust of the Emperor, in whose pacific assurances they disbelieve. They try to explain their preparations by saying that the Duke of Savoy and the Prince of Piedmont are raising forces, and that the Prince will enter the territory of Bar to recover the territories that the Swiss are holding, and will then enter Bresse and Piedmont. All this is very unlikely, and is only invented as an excuse for sending more troops to Piedmont. The King of France has warned the Swiss Protestants of the Prince of Piedmont's designs, and of the Emperor's plans to obtain universal dominion. . . . .
I expect all these preparations will cool somewhat now, in consequence of the King's illness; for I know how evil his tendency was. But since he fell so seriously ill he has frequently said that his wish is in future to live in peace and quiet for the rest of his days. But if ever he be better again he will be more furious than before. He gave a very good reception to the English gentleman who visited him to express the King of England's desire to remain friendly. But since the gentleman returned home, the King has learnt that the English have been sending troops across the channel in large numbers to reinforce their garrisons on this side, and great quantities of materials also are being sent into Boulogne.
The King was extremely put out at this, and sent word to the English Ambassador that that was a strange way of keeping friendly. The ambassador replied that what was done was only with the object of preserving their own territories, and had no hostile meaning. The King remains dissatisfied at this, as it is evident that they (the English) have no intention to restore Boulogne to him, since they are strengthening it so much. There is therefore not much cordiality between them just now. Paulin is still in England, but the result of his negotiations is not known. The King of France summoned him to return once but soon sent him back again. So far as I can hear Paulin's long delay is making the King suspicious of the English, who would be very glad to see the last of him (Paulin); whilst people here say that he is not staying without good reason.
The Pope has informed the King of France of the reply given by the Emperor to the envoy sent by his Holiness to propose the establishment of a close alliance (between the Emperor and Francis). When the King of France heard it he said that it was evident that the Emperor had no desire to treat with him, as he always stood out for the restitution of Piedmont, which he (Francis) would never give up to his dying day, even if a hundred thousand men had to be sacrificed. The Dauphin is very vigilant of the principal French officers kept in Piedmont, and offers to go thither in person if necessary to defend it. There is, indeed, an idea of sending M. d'Aumale thither to assist the Prince of Melfi, the Dauphin saying that if d'Aumale goes he will be as sure as if he were there in person.
21 March, 1547.


1 Fiosco's conspiracy.
2 i.e. Ferdinand and Isabella. This was in the Cortes of Medina del Campo in 1475 to repel the invasion of Spain by the Portuguese in favour of the Beltraneja, the princess who claimed the crown in opposition to Isabella.
3 The details of Renegat's (or Reniger's) piracies will be found in Vol. 8 of the present Calendar.
4 A similar letter to the above with merely verbal variations was written on the same date to the Queen Dowager.
5 i.e., His mother Queen Juana, who was confined as a lunatic.